Two Steps Forward, One Step BackOr Vice Versa: Labor Rights Under Free
Trade Agreements from NAFTA,
Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin
America, and Beyond
By MARLEY S. WEISS*

AS THE UNITED States negotiates an ever-expanding set of free
trade agreements built upon the pattern created under the North
American Free Trade Agreement' ("NAFTA") it is important to analyze the successes and failures of the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation 2 ("NAALC"), the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement
and its progeny. The NAFTA/NAALC Parties include the United
States and its nearest neighbors, Mexico, and Canada, but an ambitious United States free trade negotiations agenda aims to export this
regional integration approach to other countries near and far.
Subsequently concluded free trade agreements ("FTA") with Jor3
dan, Chile, 4 and Singapore, 5 draw upon the NAFTA/NAALC model
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1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
289 (Parts I-Ill, Annex 401), 32 I.L.M. 605 (Parts IV-VIII, Annexes I-VII) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
2. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC]. Together with NAFTA and the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, September 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
1480 [hereinafter NAAEC], the NAALC entered into force on Jan. 1, 1994. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 3311(b) (2000); NAALC supra, art. 51, 32 I.L.M., at 1514.
3. See Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.Jordan, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTAI.
4. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. and Chile Conclude
Historic Free Trade Agreement 2 (Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Chile Press Release], available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/12/02-114.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). (as of
this writing, the full text of the agreement was not available); Rosella Brevetti, Vargo Praises
Agriculture Provisions in U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 114 (Jan.
16, 2003) (legal scrub of text underway; no date set for public release); Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Free Trade With Chile: Summary of the
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of trade- labor rights linkage,6 albeit with important variations. 7 The
administration has already notified Congress of its intent to negotiate
additional similar bilateral free trade agreements with Australia," and
Morocco, ' and is consulting with Congress about others."'
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA] (official
summary of tile agreement), available at www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/samerica/
2002-12-11-chilesummary.pdf (last visited Jai. 13, 2003). Congressional approval of legislation to implement the agreement is not expected until late 2003, at the earliest. See also
Christopher S. Rugaber et al., Grassley to Separate Chile, Singapore Bills; Rep. Thomas Plans to
Take Up Bill, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 210 (Jan. 30, 2003).
5. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts: U.S., Singapore
Agree on Core Elements of FTA: Agreement Would Spur Trade and Investment (summarizing agreement as "including improvements called for by Congress in Trade Promotion
Authority" with respect to labor and the environment), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
regions/sasia?/2002-12-1 1-singapore-summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Summary of the U.S.-Singapore FTA]; Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Trade Facts: Free Trade With Singapore: America's First Free Trade Agreement in Asia 9,
availableat http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Singapore Trade
Facts]. As of this writing, the full text of the agreement was not available. Legislation implementing the Singapore FTA was expected to be adopted in 2003, perhaps before the August Congressional recess. See Christopher S. Rugaber, Envoys Expect Hill to Pass Singapore
ETA by Summer, As Business Groups Land Pact, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 229 Uan. 30, 2003).
6. There is voluminous literature about trade-labor linkage, both pro and con. For a
recent example, see William B. Gould, IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case
for InternationalLabor Standards, 80 NEB. L. REv. 715 (2001) (summarizing many of these
arguments). This article takes as a given the view that expanded trade should be conditioned upon observance of basic labor standards. This is the policy stated by United States
administrations in negotiating agreements such as the NAALC, and free trade agreements
with Jordan, Chile and Singapore, and is now enshrined as federal policy in trade promotion authority legislation and in trade preference laws.
7. The most salient of these variations are discussed infra text and accompanying
notes Part II.C.
8. See 148 CONG. Ri.:C. H 10211 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2002) (recording arrival of notification friom the President that he intends to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement
with Australia); see also Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Zoellick
Notifies Congress of Intent To Initiate Free Trade Negotiations With Australia (Nov. 13,
2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/1 1/02-1 10.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2003); Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, to Senator Byrd (Nov. 11, 2002)(Notification of
Presidential intent to initiate negotiations for a FTA with Australia), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/1 1/2002-11-1 3-australia-byrd.PDF (last visited Mar. 28, 2003)
[hereinafter Zoellick Australia Letter]; Christopher S. Rugaber, USTR Announces Timetable
for Australia Trade Talks; Industry Groups List Concerns, 20 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 182 (jan.
23, 2003).
9. See Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning Proposed
United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, 67 Fed. Reg. 63187 (Oct. 10, 2002); Executive Communication 9677, 148 CoN.. Ric. H8020 (Daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (providing
notification of intent to initiate negotiations for a ETA with Morocco); Executive Communication 9172, 148 CONc. Ri'c. H6255 (Sept. 13, 2002) (providing a letter from USTR
transmitting an outline of the administration's plans to pursue an FTA with Morocco); see
also U.S.-Morocco Trade Backgrounder, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/regonal.shtml (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Cary C. Yerky, U.S., Morocco End First
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The U.S.-Jordan agreement, in turn, has provided a model for
U.S. trade promotion authority ("TPA") legislation. It links free trade
and labor rights as a condition of limiting legislative procedure in
consideration of a trade agreement to an up or down "fast-track" vote
without possibility of amendment."I Pursuant to the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act ("BTPAA"), sub regional and regional free
trade agreements are under negotiation in addition to the bilateral
agreements just mentioned. A sub regional agreement, intended to
cover Central America,' 2 may embrace the NAALC model, the Jordan
Week of F'A Talks, On Target To Finish Negotiations This Year, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 244
(Jan. 30, 2003). The U.S.-Morocco talks include eleven negotiating groups, including one
on labor rights.
10. A possible FTA with New Zealand is also under consideration. See Zoellick Australia Letter, supra note 8. Bills have been submitted which would authorize negotiation of
FTAs with Turkey, S.3150, 148 CONG. REC. S10888-10889 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002), and
with Afghanistan, S.3151, 148 CONG. REC. S 10888-10889 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002). Panama and the United States have started discussions about a bilateral FTA. See Rosella
Brevetti, U.S., Five Central American Nations Kick Off FTA Talks, Aim To Conclude by End of
Year, 20 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 113 (Jan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter CAFTA Kick OfJ]. Other
Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay, have expressed an interest in negotiating a free trade pact with the United States See Rossella
Brevetti, CentralAmerican Nations Hope to ProduceFree Trade Pact by Year's End, 20 Int'l Trade
Rep (BNA) 138 Uan. 16, 2003) [hereinafter CAF'A By Year's End]. The Bush administration has also proposed to create a network of bilateral FTAs with members of the Association of Asian Nations. See Daniel Pruzin, w1o Tries to Stay the Coursefor Cancun Ministerial
and Beyond, 20 Int'l Trade Rep (BNA) 126 (Jan. 16, 2003). Charlene Barshefsky, the USTR
during the Clinton administration, has urged negotiation of bilateral treaties with other
Middle Eastern countries, along with a Middle Eastern regional trade preference program.
See Charlene Barshefsky, The Middle East Belongs in the World Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
2003, at A35. In addition to ETAs negotiated by the United States, there is a growing network of customs union agreements and free trade areas to which the United States is not a
party, among other countries in the region. See generally, e.g., Jos6 Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs
& Maryse Robert, Introduction to TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 1, 4 (Jose Manuel
Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds., 2001); Jose Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs et al., Customs Unions, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERIcAS 45 (Jos6 Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs &
Maryse Robert eds., 2001); Maryse Robert, Free Trade Agreements, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN
THE AMERIcAS 87 UJos6 Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds., 2001).
11. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act ("BTPAA") of 2002, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3801-3813 (2002). The LIP or down voting provisions regarding trade agreement implementation bills may be found at 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (2002). For the opposition view on "fast
track," including a short history, see, for example, 148 CONG. REC. S8194 (daily ed. Sep. 4,
2002) (remarks of Senator Sarbanes). Senator Baucus, Senate Finance Committee Chair at
the time the BTPAA was enacted and later ranking minority member, has urged that postBTPAA FTAs track the U.S.-Jordan FTA "exactly" as to labor rights and their enforcement,
to ensure conformity with the BTPAA criteria.
12. See Executive Communication 9679, 148 CONG. REC. H8019-8020 (daily ed. Oct.
16, 2002) (providing a notification of intent to initiate negotiations for ETA with the five
member countries of the Central American Economic Integration System: Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua); Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, to Representative J. Dennis Hastert, at http://www.ustr.gov/new/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 13,
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variation, the U.S.-Chile template, or in some other way satisfy the labor rights requirements of the BTPAA. I" Negotiation of a Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas ("FTAA"), expected to encompass thirtyfour countries-nearly the entire Western Hemisphere-is also in
progress. ' 4 However, the extent to which this agreement should incorporate any of the models' 5 tying trade privileges to labor rights obliga-

2003) [hereinafter CAFTA House Letter]; Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States and Central American Nations Launch Free Trade Negotiations, (Jan. 8,
2003) at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/01/03-01.htm [hereinafter CAFTA Press Release]; set,
also Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Free Trade
With Central America: Strengthening Democracy, Promoting Prosperity, (Jan. 8, 2003) at
http://w.uLstr.gov/regions/whemisphere/canerica/2O3-O-O8-cafta-facs.PDF
[hereinafter CAFTA Facts]. The ministers of the CAFTA countries have established five negotiating groups, including one on labor and environment. See Brevetti, CAIJ'A By Year's End,
supra note 10.
13. Pronouncements that CAFTA will follow the U.S.-Chile template may be found,
for example, in California Chamber of Commerce, U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
http://www.calchamber.com/inter-national/internationalchile.htn; Letter from William
S. Merkin, Executive Director, Labor/Industry Coalition for International Trade/Coalition
for Open Trade to Gloria Blue, Office of the U.S.T.R. Uan. 26, 2001), available at http://
www.dbtrade.com/licit/chile us-fta-coml.htm. USTR Zoellick has termed the U.S:-Chile
FTA "a benchmark" to work from in negotiating a CAFTA. See Brevetti, CAFTA Kick Off
supra note 10; Brevetti, CAFITA By Year's End, supra note 10 ("formalization of labor and
environmental concerns along the lines of the U.S.-Chile FTA" is likely according to one
trade consultant).
14. The proposed FTAA would encompass thirty-four countries throughout the hemisphere, including Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
See Free Trade Area of the Americas homepage, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca e.asp (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Free Trade Area of the Americas:
Negotiators Move Toward Agreement That Will Have Benefits, Costs to U.S. Economy,
GAO-01-1027, at 14 n.] (Sep. 2001), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01l027.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter GAO FTAA Report]. On the FTAA, see generally Peter F.
Allgeier, Speech at the Parliamentary Summit for Hemispheric Integration, Theme: The
NAFTA Experience and Hemispheric Integration (Nov. 19, 2002) available at http://
www.ustr.gov/speech-test/assistant/2002-11-19_Allgeier.PDF; CAFTA Facts, supra note 12,
at 2 (negotiation of CAFTA is a stepping stone, along with NAFTA and the U.S.-Chile ETA,
towards goal of negotiating FTAA by 2005). The official text of the fragmentary second
draft agreement is available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ftaa2002/
secondtext.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). [hereinafter FTAA Second Draft].
15. The Office of the USTR, for example, has recently backed away from acceptance
of Chile as a model for other FTAs or the ETAA. See, e.g., Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Expects
Brazil to Miss Ff'AA Deadlinefor Services, Procurement, Investment Offers, 20 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 236 (Jan. 30, 2003) (stating that the U.S.-Chile FTA is not a "precise template" for
every agreement that the United States negotiates, according to Deputy USTR Allgeier).
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tions is extremely controversial. 6 Negotiation of a separate regional
free trade agreement with the South African Customs Union
("SACU"), comprised of South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland,
17
and Botswana, has also commenced.

I.

Introduction

Inclusion of effective, enforceable labor rights provisions in a
Central American Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA") or an FTAA is
especially imperative. These trade agreements would displace a combination of "carrots""' and "sticks"' 9 provided in existing trade preference legislation, designed to improve developing country's labor
16.

See, e.g., Csar Gavira, Integration and Interdependence in the Americas, in TOWARD

FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 303, 314 (Josh Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert

eds., 2001) (stating that the chances for concluding an FTAA on schedule by 2005 depend,
inter alia, on "the prospects for reaching consensus on the treatment of environmental and
labor issues in hemispheric dialogue"); Josh Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert,
The FJ"AA Process: From Miami 1994 to Quebec 2001, in TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS

279, 299 (Jos6 Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds., 2001). See generally GAO
FTAA Report, supra note 14, at 45, 48, 50 (summarizing divergent views on inclusion of
labor and environment commitments within FTAA).
17. Executive Communication 10064, 148 CONG. REc. H9022 (Nov. 14, 2002) (transmitting notification of Presidential intent to initiate negotiations for an FTA with the five
member countries of the South African Customs Union). The ministers established five
working groups, including one on labor and the environment. Congress has also declared
a policy favoring negotiation of FTAs with sub-Saharan African countries and urged the
administration to develop a plan and timetable for negotiations. See 19 U.S.C. § 3723
(2002).
18. "Carrots" refers to positive incentives for countries to comply with international
labor, human rights, or other standards. Besides trade-related programs, there are several
bodie§ of United States "carrot" legislation, conditioning foreign aid or other benefits
upon a developing country, inter alia, ensuring basic labor fights to its labor force. The
Foreign Assistance Act, for example, conditions certain United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding for economic development on the applicant country satisfying labor rights and other criteria. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2002). United States
delegates to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other international
financial institutions are required by law to condition United States support for projects on
the host country committing to ensure minimum labor rights protections. See id. § 1621.
Products manufactured by bonded child labor may not be legally imported into the United
States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2002). These provisions, being unrelated to tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, would be less affected by the negotiation of new FTAs. Trade-related legislation which might survive negotiation of new FTAs is discussed supra note 17.
19. "Sticks" refers to negative responses to a country's failure to comply with international labor, human rights, and other norms. Some legislation incorporates both carrots
and sticks, the offer of advantageous trade treatment upon satisfaction of labor rights conditions, plus the "stick" of a threat of withdrawal if those domestic labor rights are not
maintained.
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rights performance.211 Unilateral American measures offer the "carrot"
of trade benefits to induce countries to improve their labor policies as
a condition 2' of being designated a beneficiary country. 2 These laws
then provide the "stick" of the threat of withdrawal of trade preferences if the country's labor rights and other conditions fail to maintain the statutorily set standards, or fail to improve any further. 2-,
20. Some United States legislation provides for trade-related carrots and sticks that
would be less affected by free trade agreement developments than the trade preference
provisions discussed above. The most important of these is section 301 of the Omnibus
Trade Act of 1988, which permits the United States to take retaliatory trade action against a
trading partner which commits "unfair trade practices," including labor rights violations.
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2002). The United States may take retaliatory trade action "[i]f the
[USTR] determines ... that (1)an act, policy or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable ... and burdens or restricts [United States] commerce, and (2) action is appropriate.
lId. § 2411
...(b) (emphasis added). A policy or practice may be "unreasonable," even if it
does not violate international legal rights of the United States, if it is "otherwise unfair and
inequitable." Id. § 2411 (d) (3) (A). Such acts, policies, or practices include those which
constitute a persistent pattern of conduct that-(l) denies workers the right of
association, (11)denies workers the rights to organize and bargain collectively,
(I11)
permits any form of forced or compulsory labor, (IV) fails to provide a minimum age for the employment of children, or (V) fails to provide standards for
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of workers.
[d. § 2411 (d) (3) (B) (iii). However, such acts are not to be treated as "unreasonable," if the
USTR determines that
(I) the foreign country has taken, or is taking actions that demonstrate a significant and tangible overall advancement in providing throughout the foreign country . . . the rights and other standards described [above], or (II) such acts,
policies, and practices are not inconsistent with the level of economic development of the foreign country.
Id. § 2411 (d) (3) (C) (i). Section 301 is unlikely to be affected by negotiation of new FTAs
because Congress has strongly instructed the USTR to treat preservation of unilateral
United States trade retaliation authority as a major bargaining objective in negotiations for
any free trade agreement. See BTPAA, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b) (14) (2002). A second traderelated scheme which new FTAs would probably leave unaltered is the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation program ("OPIC"). OPIC insures overseas investment of United
States businesses against loss owing to war, revolution, expropriation, and similar risks,
provided that the country meets eligibility criteria including labor requirements. See 19
U.S.C. § 2191 (2002). The availability of insurance encourages foreign direct investment in
these cotntries, a major incentive to improve their labor rights adoption and
implementation.
21. Each of these laws involves several conditions in addition to labor rights
conditions.
22. On non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere,
see generally Karsten Steinfatt, Preferential and PartialScope Trade Arrangements, in TOWARD
FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 108 Uos6 Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs & Maryse Robert eds.,
2001)
23. On unilateral trade preference measures with labor conditionality, see generally
Lance Compa &Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the Generalized System of Preferences:A 20-Year
Review, 22 COMp. LAB. L. & PoL'vJ. 199 (2001); Lance Compa, Exceptions and Conditions: The
MultilateralAgreement on Investment and InternationallaborRights: A Failed Connection, 31 CORNELL INT'L, L.J. 683, 689 (1998). It is the threat of loss of trade preferences that would be
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Based on their level of development, 24 most of the countries which
would be covered by these FTAs are currently eligible for trade preference beneficiary designation25 under the United States Generalized
System of Preferences 26 ("GSP") and an alphabet soup of regional
trade preference legislation, including the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act 27 ("CBERA"), the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partner9
ship Act 2 8 ("CBTPA"), the African Growth and Opportunity Act2

("AGOA"), the Andean Trade Preference Act 30 ("ATPA"), and the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act"' ("ATPDEA").
CBERA-eligible countries include thirty Caribbean Basin countries, of which twenty-four have currently been designated benefidisplaced by FTA coverage, so the proposed expansion of the free trading regime most
implicates these types of linked labor rights provisions. Other United States programs, discussed supra note 22, offer incentives to countries to meet labor criteria. These would be
unaffected by the negotiation of new trade agreements, because the incentives of these
programs are not dependent on trade relations.
24. However, to become fully eligible for these preferences, countries must also satisfy
additional qualifications which some of them do not meet. See generally Lance Compa, supra
note 23, at 699.
25. After meeting the prerequisites for eligibility, countries still must satisfy additional
criteria, including, inter alia, labor rights criteria, for beneficiary designation under each of
these statutes.
26. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2467 (1999 & Supp. 2002). The GSP provision defining "internationally recognized worker rights," Section 507(4) of the Trade Act of 1974, appears at
id. § 2467(4). A 2002 amendment adding to the minimum age provision a prohibition on
"worst forms of child labor" is found at 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4)(D). The GSP and regional
trade preference legislation apply to "developing" countries. By various estimates, as many
as twenty-five of the thirty-four FTAA countries could be considered to be smaller or developing economies. GAO FTAA Report, supra note 14, at 78.
27. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (1999 & Supp. 2002). Criteria for designation as a beneficiary country appears in § 2702(b),(c).
28. Id. §§ 2701-2707. Criteria for designation as a beneficiary country appear in
§§ 2702(b),(c), 2703(b) (5) (B). On the operation of the CBTPA and CBERA, including
their designation criteria, see generally Office of the United States Trade Representative,
Fourth Report to Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act (December 31, 2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2002CBI-final.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter CBERA Report]. CBTPA and CBERA are part of the
broader Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI") program. A summary of the CBI programs may
be found in Steinfatt, supra note 22, at 109-12.
29. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3741 (1999 & Supp. 2002). Criteria for designation as a beneficiary country appear in § 3707(a).
30. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (1999 & Supp. 2002). Criteria for designation as a beneficiary country appear in § 3202(c),(d). A summary description of the ATPA program, prior
to its 2002 amendment, may be found in Steinfatt, supra note 22, at 112-14.
31. Title XXXI of Act of Dec. 6, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, amending, inter alia, the
ATPA, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3206 (2002). Criteria for beneficiary designation appear in
§§ 3202(c),(d); 3203(b) (6) (B).
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ciariesA2 The list includes all five potential CAFTA countries, and over
two-thirds of the thirty-four countries participating in the FTAA nego-

tiations. ATPA and ATPDEA countries include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.""
Each of these unilateral United States trade preference programs
includes its own criteria for designation as a beneficiary country. However, all take into account whether a country is "taking steps to afford
internationally recognized worker rights ''3 4 within its borders. Some
also assess the extent to which the country is actually providing such
rights as a factor in attaining beneficiary status.3 5 The definition of
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2002) (listing countries eligible for designation). The
twenty-four designated beneficiary countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,' the British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat,
Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Kitts and Christopher-Nevis, Saint Lucia,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad, and Tobago. See CBERA Report, supra note
28, at 3, 5-6. However, implementation of certain customs procedures is required as an
additional condition of CBTPA designation. As of 2001, only fourteen of the CBERA countries had met these further requirements and been designated as CBTPA beneficiaries. See
id. at 6. All five CAFTA countries are anong the CBTPA beneficiaries. See id.
33. 19 U.S.C. § 3202(b)(1)(2002).
34. The GSP includes "taking steps to afford to workers.., internationally recognized
worker rights" both as an "exclusionary," 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (2) (G) (2002), and as a "permissive" criterion. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c) (7) (2002). Both the ATPA and the CBERA follow
the GSP pattern with similar language. See 19 U.S.C. § 3202(c) (7) (exclusionary) (ATPA);
19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (exclusionary) (CBERA); 19 U.S.C. § 3202(d)(8) (permissive)
(ATPA); 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c) (8) (permissive) (CBERA). A country which is taking no steps,
and does not afford these worker rights to the workers of that country is to be excluded
from the program tinder the "exclusionary" provision. Beyond that, under the permissive
provision, the President may (but need not) take account of whether the country is taking
such steps, along with other factors, in deciding whether it should be designated a beneficiary. See generally CBERA Report, supra note 28, at 15. On the deliberate ambiguity of the
provision, affording the President maximum discretion in applying the law to serve geopolitical and foreign policy interests, see Compa & Vogt, supra note 23, at 203-04.
35. The ATPDEA and the CBTPA go farther than the ATPA and the CBERA. The
ATPDEA requires ATPA designation as a prerequisite to designation, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3203(b) (6) (B), and CBTPA requires CBERA designation as a prerequisite to designation, 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (5) (B) (2002). Both ATPDEA and CBTPA, as a condition of the
enhanced trade benefits they provide, each add identical, additional criteria, including
"the extent to which the country provides workers internationally recognized worker rights
....
The GSP, ATPDEA, and CBTPA common definition of "internationally recognized
worker rights" is a bit stronger than the language provided under Section 301. They transmute the final Section 301 criterion, "(V) fails to provide standards for minimum wages,
hours of work, and occupational safety and health of workers," 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (d) (3) (B) (iii) (V), into "acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wage, hours of work, and occupational safety and health." 19 U.S.C. § 2467(4)(E) (GSP);
19 U.S.C. §3203(b)(6)(B)(iii)(V) (ATPDEA); 19 U.S.C. §2703(b)(6)(B)(iii)(V)
(CBTPA). In addition, the ATPDEA and CBTPA add a separate, additional labor criterion,
"[w]hether the country has implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of
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"internationally recognized worker rights" in the regional trade preference laws is cross-referenced from the GSP provision. ' "
An FTAA or CAFTA would most likely displace the trade preferences of these programs, vitiating the vitality of the labor rights conditions required under the GSP statutes even if they remain on the
books. As a result, absent strong and enforceable labor rights provisions in these proposed FTAs, the FTAs would represent a significant
step backwards in the protection of labor rights as a condition of trade.
Some of the post-NAFTA free trade agreements take key steps
forward toward vindicating basic labor principles as a condition of reducing trade barriers. They add international norms as a measure of
domestic labor rights. They incorporate labor obligations into the
body of the main free trade agreement. They expand applicability of
37
trade sanctions as a stringent penalty for violations.
At the same time, however, the labor rights provisions of subsequent trade agreements may, in other respects, be characterized as
taking steps sideways or even backwards. Beneath a facade of progress,
these agreements may actually decrease the scope of the substantive
national commitments to provide labor protections for workers, the
strength of those commitments, and their overall enforceability. In adchild labor," id. § 3203(b) (6) (B) (vi) (ATPDEA), § 2703(b) (5) (B) (vi) (CBTPA), drawn
from an analogous GSP provision, rendering a country ineligible for designation as a beneficiary if it "has not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child
labor." 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (2) (H). Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(b) (2) (H), 2467(4)(D),
2467(6) (GSP), with §3203(b)(6)(B)(iii)(VI), 3203(b)(6)(B)(iv) (ATPDEA), and
§2703(b)(5)(B)(iii)(VI), 2703(b)(5)(B)(iv) (CBTPA). On the eligibility criteria for
CBERA and CBTPA, see generally CBERA Report, supra note 28, at 15-18.
36. The GSP definition includes:
(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C)
a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children, and a prohibition on the worst forms
of child labor ....; (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
19 U.S.C. § 2467(4) (2002). The GSP definition of "internationally recognized worker
rights" is incorporated by reference in the regional trade preference legislation. 19 U.S.C.
§ 3202(c) (7) (ATPA, ATPDEA); § 2702(b) (7) (CBTPA, CBERA) (emphasis added). In addition, CBTPA and ATPDEA contain separate definitional provisions that are nearly identical to the GSP language. See supra notes 35, 36. The GSP and CBTPA/ATPDEA definitions
are virtually identical with the definition of "internationally recognized laborrights" used in
the U.S.-Jordan FTA, as well as in the definition of "core labor rights" used in the BTPAA.
See 19 U.S.C. § 3813(6) (2002).
37. The Clinton administration consciously articulated these latter two developments
as U.S.-Jordan FTA advances over NAFTA/NAALC, to be negotiated into a U.S.-Chile FTA.
See J.F. Hornbeck, CRS Issue Brief: The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, at http://
fpc.state.gov/6123.htm (last visited January 13, 2003).
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dition, essential steps to improve the institutional operation of any
labor rights regime have been ignored.
Assessment of the NAFTA Parties' experience interpreting, applying and enforcing the NAALC is particularly instructive regarding the
design elements necessary to make labor rights provisions enforceable
when they are negotiated in conjunction with free trade
arrangements. ' 8
Much of the criticism of the NAALC has focused on its lack of
supranational standards,19 the negotiated rather than adjudicated nature of the application and enforcement process,'4 ' the absence of
trade sanctions penalties against a Party country found to have engaged in many types of systemic violations of the Agreement, 4 1 and
the preclusion of any penalties directed at employers whose blatant
violations of workers' rights establish the Party country's systematic
breach of its obligations. 42 Some of these criticisms are misguided,
others have merit, but they miss the main point.

38. In addition to the free trade agreements mentioned above, the United States has
entered into bilateral FTAs with Israel, Canada, and Vietnam. None of these agreements,
however, fits the NAFTA/NAALC or U.S-Jordan pattern. The agreement with Israel was
negotiated in 1985, long before NAFTA set a new pattern for addressing labor (and environmental) issues in conjunction with free trade. See Agreement on the Establishment of a
Free Trade Area, U.S.-Israel, April 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653. The U.S.-Canada Free-Trade
Agreement, H.R. REP. No. 216, at 297541 (1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988), done at
Ottawa, December 22, 1987 and January 2, 1988, and at Washington, D.C. and Palm
Springs, December 23, 1987, preceded NAFTA, and in many respects, laid the foundation
for it. The Bilateral Trade Agreement to Normalize Relations with Vietnam was negotiated
by the Clinton administration, after NAFTA but before the U.S.-Jordan ETA, as a means to
reopen economic relations with a former adversary, at that time undergoing a transition
from traditional communism in the direction of a market economy. See generally Background on the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
asia-pacific/vtnrnbackgrounder.htm. The agreement itself is available at http://
www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/text.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Jack 1. Garvey, A New Evolutionfor Fast-Tracking Trade Agreements: Managing
Environmental and Labor Standards Through ExtraterritorialRegulation, 5 UCLA J. [Nr'L L. &
FOREIC.N

Aio. 1, 19 (2000).

40. See, e.g., Jack I. Garvey, Current Development: Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute
Resolution Under the NAITA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L. L. 439,
442-43 (1995); Garvey, supra note 39, at 11. In my view, the lack of a permanent adjudicative tribunal creates significant problems beyond these.
41. See, e.g., id.
42. See, e.g., Compa, supra note 23, at 710, citing as "representative" criticism Jerome I.
Levinson, NAIA's Labor Side Agreement: Lessons from the First Three Years, in INSTITUTIE FOR
POLlC' STUDIES AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR RiHrs FUND. Founded on a view which assimilated international treaty obligations into directly enforceable domestic law, this naive view
has since been abandoned for the most part.
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It would be most apt to say that the NAALC fails to meet its own
articulated standards regarding domestic labor law: of transparency, 43
access for private actors to appropriate tribunals to redress violations, 44 due process, 45 and effective enforcement. 46 The NAALC labor
commitments themselves, while seemingly simple and clear, upon examination, are extremely difficult to interpret and apply. 47 The procedures for raising claims that a Party country has violated the NAALC
are diplomatic and negotiatory, rather than adjudicatory, 4 8 failing rudimentary criteria for transparency and due process. Both in terms of
procedures and in terms of remedies, the NAALC seems designed to
49
thwart effective enforcement.
The NAALC is analogous to a simple truth in advertising law regarding Party countries' labor laws. Its main promise is that as to labor
rights, "what you see is what you get." But with the NAALC itself, citizens do not get what they believe they see: the tri-national commitment to fully effectuate domestic labor legislation is sabotaged by an
emphasis on soft law and by the deceptive nature of the enforcement
mechanisms and remedies. If strengthened labor rights are part of the
consideration for enhanced free trade arrangements, then lack of definiteness, enforceability, and remedy render this consideration illusory; the apparent "obligations" undertaken become voluntary rather
43.

NAALC, supra note 2, arts. 5-7, 32 I.L.M. at 1504.

44. See id.art. 4, 32 I.L.M. at 1503-04.
45. See id.art. 5, 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
46. See id.art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
47. See, e.g., Marley S. Weiss, Foreword: Proceedings of the Seminar on InternationalTreaties
and Constitution Systems of the United States, Mexico, and Canada: Laboring in the Shadow of
Regional Integration,22 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 185 (1999). The legal uncertainties manifest
in the seminar conducted as part of the ministerial implementation agreement in resolution of the Fisheries Ministry case, U.S. NAO 9601, particularly well illustrate this problem.
See Proceedings of the Seminar on International Treaties and Constitutional Systems of the United
States, Mexico and Canada:Laboring in the Shadow of Regional Integration,22 MD.J. INT'Li L. &
TRADE 221 (1999) [hereinafter NAALC Seminar Proceedings].
48. See, e.g.,
Garvey, supra note 39, at 12 ("essentially directed to achieving intergovernmental consultation and political compromise").
49. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 39, at 12 ("The amount of time, number of steps, and
multiple provisions for consultation, leave no likelihood that sanctions will ever be imposed .... The Sanctions, as sanctions, are worthless."); MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W.
TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA: How THE DEAL WAS DONE 200 (2000) (quoting a Mexi-

can negotiator of the NAALC as saying "the system is not worth a damn.... Lots of public
discourse, nothing more. This is the result we wanted."). This characterization of the intractable clumsiness of the protracted NAALC enforcement scheme has been made since
the earliest days of the agreement, and may well reflect the intent of at least some of its
framers.
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than binding. Yet newer FTA labor rights provisions continue to suffer
from this defect.
The U.S.-Jordan and U.S.-Chile trade agreements, supposedly the
"gold standard" for incorporating labor rights, 5 ' epitomize the superficial solution of adding externally-set international labor standards to
the supranational enforceability of domestic ones, and incorporating
labor provisions in the main body of the agreement. 5' The inclusion
of international labor norms was hoped by proponents to add clarity
and certainty to the Party countries' labor commitments. Instead, they
may add further complexity and opaqueness. 52 Labor rights advocates
seem to be riveted on the threat of trade sanctions as a powerful stick
to induce countries to maintain and domestically enforce labor standards. However, analogous domestic United States experience, as well
as results under other United States legislation providing for trade
sanctions, suggest that while nominally available, sanctions will virtu53
ally never be applied.
This article suggests that deepening of the NAFTA/NAALC
model should accompany any widening, particularly in the context of
a trade area encompassing several Central American countries or the
Western Hemisphere. 54 Only in the context of more stable institutional arrangements can one envisage labor provisions which fulfill
the goals of the initial negotiation of the NAALC: to preserve existing
labor laws; to protect against a downward spiral of labor laws and practices competitively intended to encourage expanded trade and for50. Compare, e.g., 148 CONc;. REC. S9933-9943 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2002) (remarks of
Senator Baucus, complaining that U.S.-Chile FTA may not meet the "Jordan standard"
incorporated into the BTPAA), with 148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (remarks of Senator Grassley protesting that "labor officials plan to hold future agreements to
standards set in . . .Jordan [FTA], which they consider a model of backing up labor...
provisions with enforceable sanctions," that "some members of Congress are even arguing
that future agreements must follow the Jordan Standard,'" and decrying the "public remarks of the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee who urged the administration to
follow the model of the Jordan Free Trade Agreement 'exactly' in implementing the labor
and environmental provisions of the [BTPAA], contending instead that flexibility was intended tnder the BTPAA because "one size does not fit all" trading partner countries).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 122-124 (U.S.-lordan); 152-157 (U.S.-Chile).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 177-178.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 103-106.
54. Starting with Mexican President Vicente Fox, many have cited a need to deepen
institutional arrangements. See, e.g., ROBERT A. PASTOR, TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY: LESSONS FROM THE OLD WORLD FOR THlE NEW (2001); Robert A. Pastor, NAFTA Is
Not Enough: Steps toward a North American Community, in THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN
INTEGRATION 87 (Peter Hakim & Robert E. Litan eds., 2002); Andr(s Rozental, Integrating
North America: A Mexican Perspective, in THE FUTIR E OF NORTi AMERICAN INTEGRAION 73,
79-82 (Peter Hakim & Robert E. Litan eds., 2002).
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eign direct investment; to foster effective enforcement of each Party's
domestic labor laws; and, ultimately, to result in a leveling upwards of
labor rights and living standards. 55 In particular, unless the agreements incorporate their own labor standard-setting mechanism, two
institutional elements are critical: a monitoring and enforcement
agency, and a permanent, impartial tribunal. The substance of the "effective enforcement" commitment must be improved. In addition,
remedies must be rethought to ensure more certain applicability as
well as deterrent effect.
The following section of this article summarizes the main elements of the NAALC labor rights regime, and compares them to the
approaches taken thereafter in the U.S.-Jordan EIA, the U.S.-Chile
FTA, the U.S.-Singapore FTA, the labor requirements of the BTPAA,
and the bargaining positions taken in the negotiations for a CAFTA
and for an FTAA. The third section outlines the enforcement procedure and remedies provided under the NAALC, and presents a statistical analysis of the NAALC cases processed so far through the public
communications/submissions procedure. It identifies deficiencies in
the operation of the NAALC, made apparent through this examination of the nature of cases contested, as well as their resolution. The
fourth section questions whether in later FTAs, progress in negotiating effective, enforceable labor rights provisions is in fact being made.
It also presents conclusions about future development of agreements
effectively conjoining labor rights and free trade arrangements.
II.
A.

Labor Rights Elements in the NAALC and Its Progeny
NAFTA and the NAALC: An Introductory Overview

As is detailed extensively elsewhere, 5 6 the labor and environmental provisions of NAFTA were an afterthought. The administration of
55.

On the underlying goals behind negotiation of the NAALC, see FREDERICK W.
NAFTA: THE SCIENCE ANI ART OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1998); see aLso
NAALC, supra note 2, at 1502-03, stating
improv[ing] working conditions and living standards in [each country] ....
protect[s], enhance [s] and enforce [s] basic workers' rights; ... promotinghigher living
standards as productivity increases; . . fostering investment with due regard for the
importance of labor laws and principles; encouraging employers and employees
in each country to comply with labor laws ....
Likewise, "(a) improve working conditions and living standards...; (b) promote, to the
maximum extent possible, the [eleven] labor principles... ; and (f) promote compliance
with and effective enforcement by each Party of its labor law . ... " I.
56. There is a very large area of literature on the negotiation and implementation of
NAFTA, the NAAEC, and the NAALC. See generally, e.g., MAYER, supra note 55; CAMERON &
TOMLIN, supra note 49.
MAYER, INTERPRE'ING
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President George H.W. Bush negotiated the original free trade agreement, and during the 1992 presidential election campaign, the impact
of free trade on the jobs and labor rights of Americans became a major campaign issue. Third party presidential candidate Ross Perot inveighed about the "great big sucking sound" that would be caused
United States workers' jobs heading south to Mexico if NAFTA were
ratified. United States Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton, caught between his commitment to expansion of free trade and the pressure
from his political allies in the United States labor and environmental
movements, crafted a compromise position: he would support NAFTA
subject to the inclusion in side agreements of provisions protecting
against a downward spiral in both labor and environmental
57

protections.

After his election, President Clinton attempted to make good on
these campaign promises. It was not feasible to reopen the main
agreement; both Canada and Mexico heavily resisted even negotiating
side agreements including labor and the environment, regarded by
many as independent of, if not at odds with, free trade. The eventual
58
compromise was the negotiation of two weak side agreements.
Several factors distinguish the negotiations for the North American agreements from other regional integration schemes. The economically, 59 militarily, and culturally" dominant position of the
57.
58.

Garvey, supra note 39, at 9; CAMERON & TOMLIN, siupra note 49, at 180-81.
See, e.g.,
See generally, e.g., MAYER, supra note 55; CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 49, at

181-207. It has also been suggested that this made it easier for the Clinton administration
to gain Congressional approval and to avoid an environmental impact review. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 40, at 440 & n.8.
59. Mexico's economy is less than one twentieth the size of that of the United States.
See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Report on the Operation and Effect
of the North American Free Trade Agreement, at 5, available at http://www.ustr.gov/reports.index.shtml [hereinafter NAFTA Effects Study]. Canada's is one-tenth. See Peter Hakim & Robert E. Litan, Introduction, in TIHE FUTURE OF NORTi-i AMERICAN INTECRATION 1,28
(Peter Hakim & Robert E. Litan eds., 2002); see also, e.g., Perrin Beatty, Canada in North
Ame'ica, in TiI- FUTURE. OF NORTH AMERI(AN INTEGRATION 31, 53 (Peter Hakim & Robert E.
Litan eds., 2002) ("Despite wide differences in the sizes of European countries' populations and economies, no one country is so dominant that the rest of the continent has to
do business with it on its terms.").
60. As to Canada, see, for example, Lars Osberg & Teresa L. Cyrus, Poverty hnpacts of
Trade, Macroeconomic and Social Policy-Canadaand the United States in the 1990s, in COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, NOR

COMES AND PRODUCrVTV IN NORTH

I AMERICAN

AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION, IN-

AMERICA: PAPERS FROM THE

2000

SEMINAR

53, 54

(2001), available at http:// www.naalc.org/eglish/ptublications/selninar2000_papers.htnm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2003) (Canadians are "concern[ed] about national identity and ctltural distinctiveness. The vast majority of Canadians live within 100 kilolneters of the
United States border and experience a daily inundation of American popular culture. Distinguishing ourselves from 'the Americans' has therefore long been a preoccupation of
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United States relative to its two neighbors; Mexico's particular history
of colonization, military, and economic subordination; 6 1 the enormous disparities in political development, economic development,
and the standard of living between Mexico and the two northern
countries6 2 all combined to counteract ambitions for market unifica63
tion with strong pressures to retain maximum political autonomy.

Different levels of entrenchment of the rule of law, and its antithesis,
corruption and cronyism, among the three countries, reinforced opposition to deeper forms of regional integration. 4
Throughout the negotiation of NAFTA, as well as during negotiation of the side agreements, Canada, Mexico, and the United States all
evinced great concern that every aspect of the agreements maximize
preservation of national sovereignty. 65 Each country had somewhat
many Canadians."). Both Mexican and Canadian concern about American dominance operate to discourage them from enthusiastically supporting possible future deepening of
NAFTA into a customs union or economic community. See, e.g., Hakim & Litan, supra note
59, at 26-27.
61. "Heroic opposition to American aggression is a central theme of Mexican history."
MWER, supra note 55, at 32. On the development of the Calvo doctrine, requiring foreign
direct investors to abide by the same domestic laws and justice system as local residents,
and to exhaust domestic law prior to invoking international remedies, and the impact
upon this principle of NAFTA, see Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, InternationalLaw and National Sovereignty: T"he NAFPA and the Claims of Mexican Jurisdiction, 19 Hous. J. INI'ir. L. 565
(1997). Canada has similar fears of being swallowed by its neighbor to the north, economically and culturally, if not politically. See, e.g., Beatty, supra note 69, at 33-35, 56 ("Creating
Canada required an act of conscious political will to overcome the strong pull of the
United States, and maintaining its uniqteness requires similar determination.").
62. As Hakim & Litan put it, "The major members in the EU are more equal in size,
whereas NAFTA is defined by its asymmetry." Hakim & Litan, supra note 59, at 16. These
disparities have persisted through the present. See, e.g., id. at 20, 22-23, 25-26.
63. Mexican President Salinas, for example, announced that Mexico would seek "free
trade with the U.S .... but not a common market like ... Europe," after his Senate "consultation forum" urged him to negotiate an FTA with the United States that "would preserve
the country's political and economic sovereignty and leave Mexico free to establish its
trade policy with the rest of the world." MAWER, supra note 55, at 44 (quoting Mexican President Cals for Free Trade with U.S., May 22, 1990).
64. Flaws in Mexican democracy, the rule of law, and the prevention of corruption
remain through the present as key impediments to deepening the NAFTA regional integration arrangement. See, e.g., Hakim & Litan, supra note 59, at 23, 25-26. However, it is far
from clear why, if Mexican courts are not transparent, honest, fair, and reliable enough for
NAFTA foreign investors, requiring instead availability of an international arbitral tribunal,
see Sepulveda Amor, supra note 61, at 588-89, they are nevertheless good enough to ensure
labor rights, domestic or international, to Mexican workers.
65. See generally CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 49; MAYFR, sUpra note 55. As to the
United States, see alo Garvey, supra note 40, at 447-48 (adoption of ad hoc arbitration
rather than a permanent tribunal tnder NAFTA "was recognition that the U.S. Congress
would resist this additional loss of sovereignty on international trade issues"). Sepulveda
Amor has gone so far as to argue that NAFTA's protections for United States and Canadian
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different motives for adopting this position, and each emphasized different aspects, but this unifying concern is evident in both the structural arrangements and the substantive commitments of both
NAFTA""1 and the NAALC.
The Parties' near-obsession with the preservation of sovereignty is
immediately apparent in the NAALC text itself. The Preamble "affirm[s the Parties'] continuing respect for each Party's constitution
and law." 67 The general commitment to maintain and strive "to provide for high labor standards," commences by "[a]ffirming full respect
for each Party's constitution and recognizing the right of each Party to
establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its labor laws and regulations.

'8
6

The parties to the NAALC were especially concerned with full
preservation of the sovereignty of each Party in establishing or changing its own labor policy, legislation, and regulation. On the Mexican
side in particular, retaining unaltered its corporatist system of industrial relations was deeply intertwined with the preservation of political
hegemony for the dominant political party, the Revolutionary Institutional Party ("PRI"). Potential outside intervention in this area was a
deal-breaker.: 9
As a result, the NAALC provides no content for substantive labor
law other than the general commitment to maintain high standards in
each of eleven covered labor law areas. 7 1 Promises to promote compliance with and provide effective enforcement of domestic labor laws,
along with procedural guarantees regarding domestic law, constitute
the only firm commitments in the agreement. The undertaking of
these obligations is expressly made dependent upon the domestic political choices in each country as to the substantive provisions enacted
and maintained in domestic labor law. 7 ' The listing of eleven mutually
investors violates the Mexican constitution both by delegating adiudicatory sovereignty to
international institutions and by disfavoring Mexican investors compared to those from the
two trading partner countries. See Sepulveda Amor, supra note 61, at 573.
66. See, e.g., Hakim & Litan, supra note 59, at 18, 19; Beatty, supra note 59, at 53. "With
the exception of dispute settlement provisions and NAFTA environmental and labor side
agreements, the existing North American structure was built solely on international legal
texts-often subject to differing interpretations." Rozental, supra note 54, at 79. See generally
MAYER,

supra note 55.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
force its

NAALC, supra note 2, at 1502-03.
Id. at 1503.
See, e.g., CAMERON & TOMlIN, supra note 49, at 188-89, 191, 195-200, 204-07.
See NAALC, supra note 2, art. 2, at 1503.
Each Party's art. 3(1) obligation to "promote compliance with and effectively enlabor law," id. art. 3(1), at 1503, is subject to art. 42, id. at 1513, which excludes the
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accepted labor principles in Annex 1 is preceded by the reservation
that "[t]he following are guiding principles that the Parties are committed to promote, subject to each Party's domestic law, but do not
establish common minimum standards for their domestic law."' 72 The
insistence on sovereignty underlies the negotiators' failure to adopt
any transnational labor standards in the NAALC and their refusal to
provide any tri-national mechanism for their subsequent adoption. 73
The sovereignty imperative also underlies the Parties' refusal to
create stable, well-articulated tri-national institutions to implement
and develop the Agreement.7 4 The only tri-national structure is the
Commission on Labor Cooperation 75 (the "Commission"). One component of the Commission, the Ministerial Council, is simply the labor
ministers of each of the three Parties, rather than a true tri-national
body. 7" The Ministerial Council is the governing body of the Commis78
sion, hence of the NAALC, 77 and operates by consensus.
The Secretariat, which reports to the Ministerial Council, is the
one permanent, tri-national body. The Secretariat management and
staff owe their allegiance to the tri-national organization as a whole,
rather than to their home countries which nominated them. 79 However, the Secretariat's functions are too limited for it to serve significant institutional purposes. It provides administrative support to the
Ministerial Council, and conducts, sponsors, and publishes research
on tri-national comparative labor law, industrial relations, and labor
economics subjects.8 0
At the domestic level, each country has established a National Administrative Office ("NAO"). The NAOs serve as the contact point
possibility of one Party undertaking labor law enforcement activities in the territory of
another Party. Art. 49, id. at 1513, excludes from actionable failures to effectively enforce
domestic labor law the reasonable exercise of prosecutorial, investigatory, regulatory, or
compliance discretion, as well as decisions about prioritization for enforcement purposes.
72. Id. annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515-16.
73.

To further make this point clear, "[t]he setting of all standards and levels in re-

spect of minimum wages and labor protections for children and young persons by each
Party," as opposed to enforcement of those standards set by each Party, is expressly excluded from "technical labor standards" the Parties commit to effectively enforce, at least
with regards to the scope of potential enforcement proceedings at the higher levels. Id. art.
49(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14.
74.

See, e.g.,
CAMERON & TOMLIN, supra note 49, at 183-85, 188-93, 198-99.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See NAALC, supra note 2, arts. 8-19, at 1504-07.
See id. arts. 8(2), 9(1), at 1504-05.
See id. art. 10(1), at 1505.
See id. art. 9(6), at 1505.
See id. art. 12(5), at 1506.
See id. arts. 13-14, at 1506-07.
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within each government regarding the NAALC, as well as maintaining
contacts between the three governments.8 ' The NAOs are strictly national, rather than tri-national organs. In practice, they have been the
main actors in turning the NAALC into an operational document.
They organize and conduct "cooperative activities,"82 and administer
the public communications process, which initiates interpretation and
enforcement of the agreement.83
The emphasis on safeguarding sovereignty underlies the failure
to provide in any of the three agreements-NAFTA, the NAALC, and
the NAAEC-for a permanent judicial or arbitral tribunal, for any trinational prosecutorial arm to investigate and pursue claimed violations, for any firm method of enforcing and remedying violations
apart from diplomacy, and for a realistically proportional remedy
which would assist rather than further injure those already suffering
because of their country's violations of its NAALC obligations. 4 The
"hard" remedies of monetary assessments and trade sanctions apply to
only a small fraction of the binding commitments in the NAALC. The
remainder of the obligations, although binding, are only subject to
investigation, reporting, and negotiation of a settlement for the viola8 5
tion, with the sunshine effect of publicity as the only real sanction.
Complementing the "soft law" approach to enforcement are provisions for "cooperative activities." These are tri-nationally sponsored
programs designed to enhance mutual understanding of the other
countries' labor law regimes, industrial relations systems, the workings
of their labor markets, and their prevalent personnel customs and
practices.8" They are no substitute for "hard law" mechanisms with
meaningful deterrent effect to discourage breach of Party obligations.
Nevertheless, NAALC cooperative activities have served important
purposes.
81. See id. art. 16, at 1507.
82. Seediscussion infra Part III.A.
83. See discussion infra Part III.A.
84. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 40, at 447-48 (adopting ad hoc arbitration rather than
a permanent tribunal under NAFTA); Rozental, supra note 54, at 79; CAMERON & TOMLIN,
supra note 49, at 183-85, 188-93, 195, 198-99. The NAALC procedures and remedies have
been castigated by many commentators. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement and InternationalLabor Standards, 3J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 173 (1999); MarkJ.
Russo, NAALC: A Tex-Mex Requiemfor Labor Cooperation, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 51
(2002).
85. Along with related flaws in the institutional arrangements, the procedures and
remedies of the NAALC are discussed in greater detail in discussion infra Part II.B.I.
86.

See NAALC, supra note 2, at 1505-06.
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Cooperative activities have expanded and deepened the reservoir
of comparative labor law and industrial relations expertise among the
three countries.8 7 "[T]o enhance mutually beneficial understanding
of the laws and institutions governing labor in each Party's territory"'8
was an explicit objective of the NAALC, both in its own right and as a
means to achieve other goals, including enhanced productivity and
improved labor law design and enforcement. By facilitating increased
contacts among the labor unions, NGOs, employers, and government
officials, cooperative activities have encouraged development of a trinational web of contacts.
Both the expertise and the contacts have proven essential in
spawning a modicum of utilization of the NAALC's creaky enforcement machinery. Worker rights advocates, both NGOs and trade unions, have drawn upon their strengthened network of cross-border
relationships and their broadened expertise in each other's labor law
and practices, to jointly assemble public communications/submissions
challenging each country's failure to effectively realize labor principles they purport to have enacted into domestic law.8 9
The major innovation of the NAALC is its solution to the competing demands of preservation of sovereignty, on the one hand, and
adoption of internationally enforceable law rights obligations on the
other: the NAALC transposes domestic law into the tri-lateral agreement, rendering it an international obligation. ° This labor rights innovation has been carried forward in every F-IA into which the United
States has entered since NAFTA. The underlying premise of this approach is that domestic labor law is adequate to fulfill mutually agreed
upon fundamental labor principles, so long as it is fully and effectively
enforced. A review of the interpretation, application, and dispute res87. See generally Commission on Labor Cooperation, The Ministerial Council's Review
of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/review.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Four Year Review
Report]; U.S. National Advisory Committee, Report of the United States National Advisory
Committee Reviewing the First Four Years of Operation of the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation, reprinted in 1998 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at D33 (May 8,
1998), [hereinafter NAC Four Year Report]. A summary of pre-1998 activities may be
found in the Ministerial Council's Review of the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation, http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/review.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2003). Information about more recent activities may be found on the U.S. NAO website, at
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/public/programs/nao/main.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003),
and the Canadian NAO website, http://www.labour-travail.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/doc/ialc-cidt/
eng/e/listnaalc.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
88. NAALC, supra note 2, at 1503.
89. See discussion infra Part II.B.2c.
90. See generally Weiss, supra note 47, at 185.
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olution processes established by the NAALC, along with the public
communications/submissions processes thereunder,' however, suggests that the sovereignty-driven institutional architecture undercuts
the potential of this approach to accomplish theseaims. 9 1
B.

Nature, Scope, and Strength of the Labor-Related Obligations
in the NAALC

The labor rights obligations provided in conjunction with a free
trade agreement may be analyzed in four respects: (1) the substantive
areas made subject to labor guarantees; (2) the sources of law, domestic and international, made subject to the commitments, including the
interrelation between commitments about domestic and international
law, as well as problems of clarity in determining the norms to which
the Parties commit; (3) the strength of the commitment, measured
both in terms of the promise, and in terms of the violation which may
trigger enforcement measures; and (4) procedural obligations, -such
as transparency of process, due process, and rule of law in the country's provision of labor rights to its labor force. This section will analyze the NAALC in terms of these four obligations.
Consider the NAALC as the starting point for comparison. A fundamental objective of the Agreement is to "promote, to the maximum
extent possible," eleven labor law principles mutually embraced by
each of the Parties.92 The eleven principles include:
(1) freedom of association and the right to organize;
(2) the right to bargain collectively;
(3) the right to strike;
(4) the prohibition of forced labor;
(5) labor protections for children and young persons;
(6) assurance of minimum labor standards;
(7) elimination of employment discrimination;
(8) equal pay for women and men;
(9) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
(10) compensation in cases of occupational illnesses and injuries; and
(11) protection of migrant workers. 9391.
92.
93.

See discussion infra Part Ill.
NAALC, supra note 2, art. I(b), at 1503.
Id. annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515-16.
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The term "labor law" is defined in subject matter terms
equivalent to these eleven principles..9 4 Two additional objectives of
the NAALC are to "promote compliance with, and effective enforcement" of each Party's labor law by that Party,"' 95 and to "foster transparency in the administration of labor law." 96
The three Party countries assume six binding obligations, which
amplify and transform into more executable form the NAALC objectives. Five of the six are specific obligations whose scope is defined as
encompassing the same eleven areas of "labor law."' 97 These five obligations may all be regarded as promoting the rule of law in the domestic labor law arena, with the term "labor law" referring to the
eleven areas addressed in the labor principles listed previously.
The core specific obligation is the broad and central commitment to "promote compliance with and effectively enforce its [domestic] labor law through appropriate government action." 98 Other
specific obligations establish conditions necessary to mobilize the participation of private actors in promoting compliance and enforcement
of domestic labor law by meeting basic standards of due process. One
requires each country to include provisions in its domestic law which
will ensure access to enforcement procedures for all persons bearing
rights under domestic labor law. 9 9 Another obligates each country to
ensure that its domestic labor law procedures are "fair, equitable, and
transparent" through a series of detailed due process-related requirements.111A fourth specific obligation is for each country to publish or
94. Compare annex 1, 32 .L.M. at 1515-16 (listing the eleven labor principles), with
art. 49 (defining "labor law"), 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14.
95. Id. art. (f),
32 I.L.M. at 1503.
96. Id. art. l(g), 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
97. The sixth is a "general commitment" to establish and maintain "high labor standards, consistent with high quality and productivity workplaces, and .. . [to] continue to
strive to improve those standards in that light." Id.
98. Id.
99. This includes not only an ability to invoke the procedures, but also access to
whatever tribunals are designated under domestic law as competent to handle such matters, whether they be "administrative, quasi-judicial,judicial or labor tribunals." Id. art. 4, at
1503-04. However, each Party is free, as it chooses, to establish a separate labor law tribunal system, or to handle such matters within its judicial system for enforcement of laws in
general. Id. at art. 5(8).
100. Id. art. 5(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1504. Procedures must comply with due process of law;
proceedings must be open to the public "except where the administration of justice otherwise requires;" the parties to the proceedings must be entitled to present evidence or information and to support or defend their positions; the proceedings may not involve
unreasonable costs, time limits, or unwarranted delays, and must not be unreasonably complicated. Id. Final decisions must be in writing, available without delay to the parties, and to
the extent consistent with domestic law, to the public, and must be based on the evidence
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otherwise make available to interested persons and Parties its domestic laws, regulations, procedures, and administrative rulings of general
application."" j This obligation, too, is aimed at promoting transparency. The final obligation is to promote public education and
awareness and ensure public availability of information about the
Party's labor laws, including substantive rights, enforcement, and compliance procedures; in addition to contributing to transparency, this
obligation is also related to promoting enforcement by mobilizing the
complaints of affected citizens. 111

All of these are binding obligations, although enforcement mechanisms in some aspects of the agreement are stronger than others. All
are strong obligations with few limiting conditions, violation of which
would seem to the uninitiated observer to be readily adjudicable were
an adjudicatory enforcement process available.""': However, in the enforcement section, additional conditions and limitations are added
that sharply curtail enforceability of these formally binding obligations. At higher stages of the implementation and enforcement procedure, a claim of failure to effectively enforce domestic law must be
both "trade related" and involve a "persistent pattern of practice." 10 4
Moreover, only eight of the eleven labor law principles may be the
subject of higher level procedures, excluding the three pertaining to
union organizing, bargaining, and the right to strike. 1 5 Only three of
the eleven labor law subject areas may reach the final stage of the

submitted by the parties, or as to that which the parties had the opportunity to be heard
during the proceedings. See id. art. 5(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1504. There must be an appropriate
right to seek review and a correction of final decisions. See id. art. 5(3), 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
Both first instance and appellate tribunals must be "impartial and independent and ... not
have any substantial interest in the outcome of the matter." Id. art. 5(4), 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
Finally, appropriate remedies must be available to litigants in these labor law proceedings,
which may include, "as appropriate," fines, penalties, imprisonment, injunctions, emergency workplace closures, orders, and compliance agreements. Id. art. 5(5), 32 I.L.M. at
1504.
101. See id. art. 6(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1504. If the Party country's law so requires, it must
also publish in advance, and afford interested persons a reasonable opportunity for comment on measures proposed for adoption. Id. art. 6(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
102. See id. art. 7, 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
103. See discussion infra Part III.B.
104. NAALC, supra note 2, arts. 23, 27(1) 29(a), 49(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1508-09, 1514.
105. See id. art. 23(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1508 (limiting coverage of Evaluation Committee of
Expert stage to "occupational safety and health or other technical labor standards); see also
art. 49(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1515 (defining technical labor standards so as to exclude freedom
of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike).
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dispute resolution process, where fines or trade sanctions are
available.' 0 6
The NAALC neither incorporates international labor law standards nor sets any of its own to apply to domestic labor law. Rather,
the negotiators analyzed the domestic laws of the other two parties in
advance of entering into the agreement, concluding that they met
"high labor standards."''

0

7

On that basis, they opted to transform the

domestic labor law regimes of each Party into the basis for their international commitments under the NAALC, minimizing external intrusion into their respective sovereignties. While the countries generally
commit to maintain and "strive to improve" their high labor standards, Io8 they reserve the right, at any time, to modify their laws in any
way they deem appropriate. 19
To summarize, in the NAALC scheme, (1) there are eleven covered substantive subject areas of labor law; (2) the only sources of law
formally made subject to NAALC commitments are domestic law; (3)
the strength of the labor law commitment is relatively high, including
"promot[ing] compliance" and "effective[ly] enforce[ing]" domestic
labor law; however, for higher stages of the enforcement process, this
standard is weakened by requiring that the country have engaged in a
systematic "pattern of practice" of violation and narrowed by requiring that the pattern demonstrably be "trade-related" in its effects if
not in its intent; the Achilles heel is the reservation of each country's
right to make changes in their labor laws, downward as well as upward;
as to eight of the eleven labor principles, it is further weakened by
their exclusion from higher steps of the enforcement process; and (4)
due process and other procedural commitments are extensive and
stringent and apply to all eleven covered substantive labor law areas;
however, higher stages of the enforcement process are of questionable applicability to the procedural commitments.

106. See id. art. 29(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1509 (limiting arbitral panel dispute resolution matters to claims of persistent non-enforcement of occupational safety and health, child labor,
and minimum wage laws).
107. Id. art. 2, at 1503; annex 1, at 1515.
108. See id. art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
109. See id.; see also art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1514 (defining "technical labor standards," and
excluding from obligations of the NAALC "the setting [as opposed to enforcing] of all
standards and levels in respect of minimum wages and labor protections for children and
young persons").

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

C.

[Vol. 37

Labor Provisions in Later FTAs

1. Canadian Bilateral FIAs Arising from Stalled United States
Talks Due to a Lack of Fast Track Authority
At the time NAFTA, the NAAEC, and the NAALC went into effect, Chile and the United States were already in negotiations over
potential Chilean accession to the North American agreements. However, after expiration of "fast track" authority and Congressional refusal to renew it, the Clinton administration found itself unable to
conclude an FTA with Chile, or for that matter, with any other country, until nearly the end of the second Clinton administration.
In the interim, Canada negotiated its own free trade agreement
with Chile, originally intended to fill the gap until Congress conferred
fast track authority on the United States President so that Chile could
accede to NAFTA.' l0 The Canada-Chile FTA,I'" parallel to NAFTA, is
accompanied by the Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation ("CCALC"), along with an environmental side agreement.'' 2 The
subsequently negotiated Canada-Costa Rica FTA labor and environmental side agreements' "' also follow the approach of a main FTA
plus two side agreements.
For the most part, the commitments and the institutional arrangements of the two Canadian bilateral labor side agreements, follow the NAFTA/NAALC model. Effective enforcement of domestic
labor law is the main commitment,' 14 coupled with transparency, ac110. See, e.g., Robert, supra note 10, at 103.
111. Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 4, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1067 [hereinafter
CCFTA]. Chile and Mexico negotiated an FTA in 1998. See, e.g., Robert, supra note 10, at
104. Chile is already a party to an agreement with the five Central American countries with
whom the United States is seeking to negotiate a CAFTA. See, e.g., id. at 105-06; see also
California Chamber of Commerce, supra note 13. In addition, Chile recently entered into a
bilateral FTA with South Korea. See Chile-U.S. Free Trade Agreement FTA News: Chile and
Korea Reach Free Trade Agreement (Oct. 24, 2002), at http://www.chileinfo.com/fta/
fta_news.html?news_id=3db87441375696c8_14166 (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
112. See Canada-Chile Agreement on Labour Cooperation, Feb. 6, 1997, 36 I.L.M.
1213, [hereinafter CCALC], available at http://labor.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/psait-spila/agreement/index.cdoc/english (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Canada-Chile Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Feb. 6, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1193 (1997).
113. Free Trade Agreement, Canada-Costa Rica, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/
Trade/cancr/English/cancrin.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/cancr/English/env.asp (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003); Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Canada-Costa Rica [hereinafter
Canada-Costa Rica ALC], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/cancr/English/
labore.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
114. Compare CCALC, supra note 112, art. 3, 36 I.L.M. at 1217 ("promote compliance
with and effectively enforce its labour law"), and Canada-Costa Rica ALC, supra note 113,
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cess to a suitable tribunal to enforce rights, and other due process
obligations.' 15 Weak bi-national institutions," 16 NAOs relabeled "contact points,"' 17 and an emphasis on cooperative activities"

8

are like-

wise drawn from the NAALC model.
The Canada-Costa Rica Agreement on Labour Cooperation ("Canada-Costa Rica ALC"), does improve upon the labor commitments
by mandating a firmer minimum standard, drawn in part from international labor instruments, against which to measure domestic labor
legislation.' I9 However, the agreement virtually eliminates meaningful
12 1
enforcement sanctions as to all labor rights commitments. 1
One step forward, one step back.
2.

U.S.-Jordan FA

The core labor rights provision of the U.S.-Jordan FTA is a
NAALC-like obligation for each Party to effectively enforce its domestic labor laws, although this "effective enforcement" obligation is narrow compared to the scope of coverage of the obligation under the
NAALC. 12 1 On the other hand, the U.S.-Jordan FTA expands upon
the NAFTA/NAALC pattern in four important respects, each responsive to widespread critical reaction to the NAIFTA/NAALC scheme.
First, unlike the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement, the labor provisions of the U.S.-Jordan free trade arrangement are contained within
the text of the main trade agreement, 22 setting an important preceart. 4 ("promote compliance with and effectively enforce its labour law"), with NAALC,
supra note 2, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
115. Compare CCALC, supra note 112, arts. 4-7,36 I.L.M. at 1217-18, and Canada-Costa
Rica ALC, supra note 113, arts. 5-8 with NAALC, supra note 2, arts. 4-7, 32 I.L.M. at
1503-04.
116. Compare CCALC, supra note 112, arts. 8-16, 36 I.L.M. at 1218-21 (institutional
mechanisms, including Council composed of labour ministers or their designees), and Canada-Costa Rica ALC, supra note 115, art. 9 (ministerial council), with NAALC, supra note
2, arts. 8-16, 32 I.L.M. at 1505 (institutional mechanisms, including Council composed of
labor ministers or their designees).
117. CompareCCALC, supra note 112, arts. 13-14, 36 I.L.M. at 1220-21 (National Secretariats as national points of contact), and Canada-Costa Rica ALC, supra note 113, art. 10
(national points of contact), with NAALC, supra note 2, arts. 15-16, 32 I.L.M. at 1507 (National Administrative Offices as national points of contact).
118. Compare CCALC, supra note 112, art. 11, 36 I.L.M. at 1220-21 (cooperative activities), and Canada-Costa Rica ALC, supra note 113, art. 12, with NAALC, supra note 2, art.
11, 32 I.L.M. at 1505 (cooperative activities).
119. See Canada-Costs Rica ALC, supra note 113, art. 2.
120. See id. arts. 11, 13-23.
121. See discussion infra Part III.A.
122. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 6, 41 I.L.M. at 70-71.
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dent for future trade agreements. 23 Second, the U.S.-Jordan ETA
commits the Parties to "strive to ensure" that internationally recognized labor rights on specified topics "are recognized and protected
by domestic law."' 12 4 Third, these provisions are coupled with an express recognition that "it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic labor laws," and a promise to "strive to ensure that it
does not waive or otherwise derogate from" its labor laws as a means
of attracting trade or investment. 2 5 I refer to this as the "anti-relaxation" commitment. Fourth, a single consultation and dispute resolution process applies to all violations of the U.S.-Jordan FTA, whether
trade-, environmental-, or labor-related, culminating in the possibility
that the "affected Party" will exercise its "entitle[ment] to take any
appropriate and commensurate" trade sanction measure.12 1 This parity of treatment of violations and sanctions was a major goal of labor
rights advocates, particularly the AFL-CIO, '2 7 although its prospects
for achieving the underlying objective of improved labor rights compliance by employers in trading partner countries are cloudy.
Measured on the same criteria as the NAALC, the U.S.-Jordan
FTA (a) covers a narrower range of substantive labor law than the
NAALC; (b) incorporates both international and domestic labor law
norms, unlike the NAALC's incorporation only of domestic norms;
(c) strengthens the commitment for the enforcement of domestic labor laws, and is in some respects greater and in other respects lesser
than in the NAALC, but the strength of the commitment as to other
123. The United States administration has trumpeted this inclusion of labor provisions
in the main body of the free trade agreement as being "the first time ever." United States
Embassy in Anmman, Jordan, FTA Frequently Asked Questions I [hereinafter US-Jordan
FTA FAQs], at http://usembassy-amman.org.jo/FA/l-TA.html (last visited January 13,
2003). However, the United States Trade Representative more carefully characterizes this
approach as "the first time in a U.S. trade agreement." Office of the United States Trade
Representative, The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Fact Sheet 2, http://
www.ustr.gov/releases/2000/ 10/factsheet.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
124. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 6(1), 41 I.L.M. at 70; see also art. 6(3), 41 I.L.M.
at 70 ("Each Party shall strive to ensure that its laws provide for labor standards consistent
with the [specified] internationally recognized labor rights and shall strive to improve
those standards in that light.").
125. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 6(2), 41 I.L.M. at 70.
126. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, arts. 16, 17, 41 I.L.M. at 76-78. However, as a condition of bringing the agreement to the floor for a vote, the leadership of the United States
House of Representatives insisted on assurances that the two countries would not rely on
trade sanctions to respond to violations of the labor and environmental provisions of the
agreement. In response, the two countries exchanged letters stating that they would seek
methods to "help to secure compliance without recourse to traditional sanctions."
127. See, e.g.,
148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (remarks of Senator
Grassley) (AFL-CIO plotting to ensure that future FTAs provide rigid parity of treatment).
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labor provisions is uncertain; and (d) provides no procedural or due
process commitments whatsoever.
The U.S.-Jordan FTA defines "labor law" in terms of its listing of
"internationally recognized labor rights."' 12 The shortness of the U.S.Jordan list-compared to that of the NAALC-significantly limits the
substantive labor law fields covered by each of the four commitments.
Of the NAALC's eleven areas of fundamental labor rights, the U.S.Jordan FTA's "internationally recognized labor rights" list entirely
omits (1) elimination of employment discrimination on grounds such
as race, religion, age, and sex; (2) equal pay for men and women; and
(3) protection of migrant workers. 2 9 It fails to expressly include the
right to strike, but it includes the right of freedom of association, and
the right to organize and to bargain collectively as developed under
international labor law."'3 o The relevant ILO conventions have been
authoritatively interpreted by ILO supervisory bodies as incorporating
the right to strike,' 3 1 so that right may be covered by implication. The
U.S.-Jordan list also omits compensation for occupational injuries and
illnesses. By a farther stretch, that might be comprehended within the
covered right to "acceptable conditions of work with respect to ...
occupational safety and health."' 3 2 The U.S.-Jordan labor law list appears to have been drawn from GSP and regional trade preference
legislation, rather than from the NAALC. These rights include "acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health," along with freedom of as-

128. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, 41 I.L.M. at 71.
129. CompareU.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 6(6), 41 I.L.M. at 71 (defining covered
labor rights), with NAALC, supra note 2, art. 49, 32 I.L.M. at 1513-14 (defining covered
labor law); and annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515-16 (identifying labor principles the Parties are
committed to promoting through their domestic labor laws).
130. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, arts. 6(6)(a)- 6(6)(b), at 71.
131. See, e.g., ILO Committee on Freedom of Association No. 1543, 74 Official Bull.,
Ser. B, No. 2, 278th Rep., 15 (1991), available at http://www.ilo.org (last visited Mar. 28,
2003) (concluding that United States MacKay Radio doctrine permitting employers to permanently replace economic strikers violated the right to strike, protected tinder ILO conventions concerning freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to
collective bargaining as necessary to effectuate these rights). The relevant conventions are
Convention No. 87, concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize, April 7,1950, availableat http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Freedom of Association Convention]; ILO Convention
No. 98, concerning the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining,JUne 8, 1949, available
at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining Convention].
132. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 6(6)(e), at 71.
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sociation, the right to collective bargaining, a minimum age for child
1 33
labor, and the prohibition against forced labor.
Not only does the U.S.-Jordan FTA cover fewer areas of substantive domestic labor law than the NAALC, but as to the effective enforcement and anti-relaxation obligations of the United States, it
omits state law. Perhaps these obligations cover only positive law, such
as statutes and regulations but not judicial or administrative precedent. In terms of sources of law, the U.S.-Jordan EA incorporates
international as well as national domestic labor law. International law,
however, is only incorporated as a floor for substantive norms, which
should be provided under domestic law. Domestic law provides the
benchmark for effective enforcement and anti-relaxation, the two
most readily enforceable obligations.
In terms of commitment stri*ngency, only the "effective enforcement" obligation mandates actual performance: it is both binding and
enforceable. Even so, the commitment is very narrowly defined. It addresses only a small set of systemic violations that affects trade relations between the Parties and is not exempted as the product of policy
choices about enforcement or compliance, nor excluded as the result
of enforcement priorities among labor rights. Inclusion of commitments to "strive" to fully incorporate international labor rights standards into domestic laws in the United States and Jordan is not as
great an advance as it might appear. The NAALC provides a general
commitment to "provide for high labor standards, consistent with
high quality and productivity workplaces, and shall continue to strive
to improve those standards in that light."' 134 While the NAALC does
not expressly include reference to internationally recognized labor
standards as the benchmark for "high" labor standards, this may be
because a country's legislation already facially incorporates a level of
133. Id. (the quoted language also appears in the GSP, ATPDEA, and CBTPA, see supra
notes 35, 36). Some commentators count these as "five" labor rights. See, e.g., Compa &
Vogt, supra note 23, at 202. This article, however, will avoid counting, since other bodies of
international labor law, including the NAALC, aggregate and count labor rights differently. For example, separately treating minimunL wages as opposed to occupational safety
and health. On the GSP and regional trade preference provisions, see supra notes 18-36
and accompanying text.
134. NAALC, supra note 2, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1503. Art. 49 further affirmatively states
that setting of all standards regarding minimum wages and regarding labor protection of
young persons by each county "shall not be subject to obligations Under" the NAALC, and
that "[e]ach Party's obligations under [the NAALC] pertain [solely] to enforcing the level
of the general nnnimum wage and child labor age limits established by that Party."
NAALC, supra note 2, art. 49, at 1514 (defining "technical labor standards").
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labor rights which is "higher."'135 Both the NAALC and the U.S.-Jordan FTA reserve to each country the right to modify their labor laws as
they see fit.' 3 6 Nevertheless, inclusion of all covered labor rights in the
full U.S.-Jordan FTA consultation and dispute resolution process is a
big advance over the NAALC; a move toward entrenchment of labor
rights within FTAs and parity of treatment for them in terms of enforcement and remedies.
Read together, the incorporation of international labor rights
standards, the recognition that a Party should not use relaxation of its
labor laws to attract foreign trade, and the prohibition on derogating
from those labor laws as a means of increasing trade are intended to
serve as a response to widespread criticism of the NAALC. Many contended that long after entering into NAFTA and the NAALC, Mexico
systematically avoided enforcement of its labor laws as a means of encouraging additional foreign direct investment and export of its
manufactures to the United States. 13 7 These actions might provide the
basis for a claimed "pattern of practice" or systematic non-enforcement with demonstrable effects on trade, which could be remediable
under the NAALC enforcement provisions, even in some cases, by
trade sanctions. However, Mexico remains completely free under the
NAALC to establish its own labor laws, and could, for example, repeal
all legislation regarding occupational safety and health without violating any NAALC provision except the hortatory general commitment
135. Cf Garvey, supra note 40, at 441 (suggesting GATT requirement that environmental provisions be internationally recognized to avoid being deemed "camouflaged trade
barriers," is a means to accept only least common denominator standards).
136. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, art. 6(3), 41 I.L.M. at 70; NAALC, supra note 2,
art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1503; see also NAALC, supra note 2, art. 49(1), at 1514 (excluding "setting of all standards and levels in respect of wages and labor protections for children and
young persons by each Party" from NAALC obligations).
137. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 84. But see, e.g., Enrique Hernfindez-Laos, The Growth qf
Real Salariesand Productivity in Mexico" A Microeconomic Approach, in COMMISSION FOR LABOR
COOPERIiON,

NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION, INCOMES AND PROPAPERS FROM THE 2000 SEMINAR 215, 218-19, 235, 239,

DUCTIVr'Y IN NORTH AMERICA:

241-42, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/seminar2OOO papers.htm
(attributing manufacturing sector wage growth in parallel with increased labor productivity
in the 1988-1993 period in part to effective trade union collective bargaining and productivity pacts with employers to share the gains); Rogelio Ramfrez, What Has Changed in the
Performanceof Employment and Wages in Mexico after NAJ7TA ? in COMMISSION FOR LABOR COOPERATION, NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION, IN:OMES AND PRODU(cI'V

ITY IN

NORTi

AMERICA:

PAPERS

FROM

TIE 2000

SEMINAR

119,

available at http://

www.naalc.org/english/publications/seminar2000_papers.htm (attributing poor performance of Mexican wage rates to unduly high wage levels prior to opening of markets to
international competition and integration, massive restructuring of Mexican industry, and

lingering hangover effects of poor macroeconomic policies).
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to "ensure that its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor
standards . . . and . . . continue to improve those standards."' 38 Its

agents could lawfully issue waivers or derogations from laws on the
books for the purpose of expanding trade with the United States. This
is often alleged about the maquiladoras. This would, perhaps, fall
outside the scope of "failure to effectively enforce" its labor laws. The
three U.S.-Jordan "strive to ensure" commitments are aimed at closing
those gaps, although the mortar may be too thin and watery to do the
job.
As far as NAALC-type due process, access to the tribunal, and
other labor law procedural commitments, there are none in U.S.-Jordan, except to the extent such commitments are implicit in making a
labor law "effectively enforceable." Nor does the agreement provide
for regular cooperative activities, despite the undoubtedly high level
of mutual ignorance of each others' labor laws and practices among
employer and worker representatives, as well as government officials.
Despite the ballyhoo that the U.S.-Jordan agreement was two steps forward, it is probably more accurately characterized as three steps forward, two steps back, and a few steps sideways, when compared to the
NAALC.
These FTA labor obligations are significant in transforming existing requirements-either under domestic labor law or International Labor Organization-related soft law international labor
instruments-into firmer international obligations, thereby mutually
binding the parties to the free trade arrangement, and in theory, subject to adjudicatory review, analysis, and public exposure, with the ultimate risk of trade sanctions. Nevertheless, the substantive labor
obligations assumed by each party are, at least ostensibly, the status
quo, which becomes the floor for domestic labor rights in light of the
FTA. As the United States embassy in Jordan put it, "There are no new
labor commitments in the FTA."''
Three steps forward, two steps back.
138. NAALC, supra note 2, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
139. U.S.-Jordan FTA FAQs, supra note 123. The FAQsheet further minimizes the substance of the FTA obligation to "strive to ensure" that "internationally recognized labor
rights ... are recognized and protected by domestic law" by treating the clause regarding
"commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up" as the exclusive source of "the internationally recognized labor rights set
forth in paragraph 6." Id. This approach to construction of the agreement, however, flies
in the face of the usual maxims of construction of legal documents, since the language of
the paragraph I provision lists "such principles" set forth in the ILO Declaration in the
conjunctive with the paragraph 6 "internationally recognized labor rights." See U.S.-Jordan
FTA, snpra note 3, art. 6, para. I (citing ILO Declaration).
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Fast Track-Trade Promotion Authority

With some modification, these four new elements from the U.S.Jordan FTA, together with the NAFTA/NAALC based requirement
that each Party observe and effectively enforce its own domestic labor
laws, have become basic labor rights criteria for newer free trade arrangements to which the United States is a party. The labor criteria
for "fast track" treatment in the BTPAA include: (1) inclusion of labor
rights in the main FTA; (2) effective enforcement of domestic labor
law; (3) recognition and protection of internationally recognized labor rights through domestic law; (4) a prohibition against relaxing
domestic labor law for the purpose of expanding trade; (5) promoting
ratification and implementation of ILO Convention No.182, the
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention; and (6) parity in enforcement procedures and remedies among labor rights and other rights,
including commercial. 14 However, the parity objective may be limited
to the effective enforcement obligation and the Worst Forms of Child
Labor Convention vigorous enforcement obligation.' 4 1 Additional labor priorities pertain to the negotiation. Furthermore, there is a related provision of reports and information to Congress and the
2
public. 14
Compliance with these labor rights conditions, together with similar provisions as to other criteria, including among others, commercial, environmental, and intellectual property, ensures that legislation
to implement a free trade agreement will be subject to a straight up or
down vote in Congress, excluding the possibility of amendment and
renegotiation.' 4 1 The extent to which each labor element must be satisfied, and how rigorously, as a condition of fast track treatment, is,
however, sharply contested. 14 4 The resolution of this domestic United
140. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802(a) (6), (7), (b)(1l), (b) (12) (G), (b)(17) (2002).
141. See id. § 3802(b)(12)(G) (setting forth the parity objective as to "principle negotiating objectives;" labor principle negotiating objectives are all contained in § 3802(b) (11),
but all are hortatory or restrictive conditions on labor rights clauses, except the effective
enforcement provision in § 3802(b) (11) (A), and the worst form of child labor provision in
§ 3802(b) (17)).
142. See id. § 3802(c).
143. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191, 3803(b) (3) (A), 3805 (2002).
144. Compare, e.g., 148 CONG. Ric. S7768 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2002) (remarks of Senator
Baucus) (advocating vote for bill reported out from conference committee on BTPAA because it adopts the U.S.-Jordan model as a "floor" for future FIA labor rights provisions),
and 148 CONG. REC. S9933, 9943 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 2002) (remarks of Senator Batctus)
(complaining that U.S.-Chile FTA may not meet the 'Jordan standard," incorporated into
the BTPAA), with 148 CONG. REC. S9107 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2002) (remarks of Senator
Grassley) (complaining that "some members of Congress are even arguing that fitre
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States legal question has important implications for the conclusion of
future trade agreements, particularly regional arrangements.
The BTPAA also contains important provisions governing executive branch procedures for initiating and concluding negotiations for
a covered trade agreement. 14 5 After completing the talks, the President must provide Congress with a report explaining how to implement the agreement, along with the text of the agreement and
implementing legislation. The report must, inter alia, identify how and
to what extent the agreement makes progress in achieving the applicable "purposes, policies, priorities and objectives" of the Trade Act, in46
cluding those relating to labor rights.
The BTPAA specifies a series of negotiating objectives on trade,
the environment, investment, transparency, corruption, and other
topics, in addition to labor, which are to guide United States trade
representatives in seeking to enter into new trade agreements. 147 Fasttrack voting treatment is conditioned, on the free trade agreement
"making progress in meeting the applicable objectives."'148 The President's
report on the nature and extent of progress toward meeting the objectives provides assistance to Congress in assessing Presidential compliance with TPA requirements. Should Congress determine that the
executive branch failed to meet these criteria as to a particular FTA,
that is, either failed to notify or consult with Congress, or "the agreement ... fail[s] to make progress in achieving the purposes, policies, priorities,
and objectives" of the Trade Act, it may adopt a procedural disapproval
agreements must follow the 'Jordan Standard,'" and objecting to the public remarks of
Senator Bauctis who urged the administration to follow the model of the Jordan Free
Trade Agreement "exactly" in implementing the labor and environmental provisions of the
[BTPAA], contending instead that flexibility was intended tnder the BTPAA because "one
size does not fit all" trading partner countries).
145. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3804(a), (d), 3805(a)(1) (2002). For those agreements already
under negotiation prior to enactment of the BTPAA, a truncated set of procedures apply,
requiring that the President, as soon as possible after enactment of the trade promotion
authority legislation, notify Congress of the negotiations as to each covered FrA, United
States objectives in the negotiations, and both before and after providing this notice to

Congress, consult with the appropriate legislative committees and Congressional Oversight
Group. See id. § 3806(b). Among the list of already in progress free trade agreements subject to this abbreviated set of procedures are the bilateral FTAs with Chile and with Singapore, and the proposed FTAA. See id.
146. Id. § 3803 (emphasis added).
147. Id. § 3802.
148. Id. § 3803(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also id. § 3803(b)(3) (conditioning fast
track voting on implementing legislation on the agreement meeting this standard, cross
referencing trade authorities procedures provision); id. § 2191 (providing trade authorities
procedures regarding implementing legislation for agreements meeting the requirements
of § 3803(b)(2)).
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resolution. 149 This renders fast-track procedures inapplicable to the
1 50
trade agreement.
The inclusion of labor objectives among the trade agreement negotiating priorities is an extremely important development. One step
forward: The direction of other steps is as yet indiscernible.
4.

Finalization of the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FEAs

Negotiation of a U.S.-Chile FTA has been completed pursuant to
the BTPAA, as has a U.S.-Singapore FTA. Congress has been officially
notified of the President's intent to enter into each of these
agreements.151
The official summaries suggest that U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore provisions largely track U.S.-Jordan on four key measures: inclusion of labor rights within the main FTA; scope of labor law subject
areas covered; international as well as domestic sources of labor rights;
strength of the labor rights commitments; and procedural labor rights
commitments. 152 The labor provisions are within the main agreement.
Like U.S.-Jordan, the Chile and Singapore FTAs incorporate both domestic labor law and international labor law norms in roughly the
same terms, and include anti-relaxation language akin to that of U.S.Jordan. However, only the commitment to effectively enforce domestic labor laws appears to be covered by the dispute resolution provisions of the agreements. 15 1 This arguably takes a step backward from
the U.S.-Jordan ETA, which textually covers all disputes over interpretation of the agreement.1 5 4 It may, however, satisfy the BTPAA objective of enforcement parity for all principal objectives, since the other
149. Id. § 3805(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Such a resolution requires a separate majority vote by each House of Congress, the second house voting within sixty days of the first,
§ 3805(b) (1) (A), an extremely unlikely occurrence.
150. Id.
151. See Transmittal of Report on the Intent to Enter Into a Free Trade Agreement
("FTA") with the Government of Chile, 149 CONG. REC. S1809 (daily ed. Jan. 30,
2003) [hereinafter Intent to Enter Into U.S.-Chile ETA]; Transmittal of Report on the Intent to Enter Into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Government of Singapore, 149
CONG. REC. S1808 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Intent to Enter Into U.S.-Singapore FITA]. The notification starts the running of a ninety day minimum period before the
President can actually enter into the agreement.
152. See Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 4; Summary of the U.S.-Singapore
FTA, supra note 5.
153. The summaries both affirmatively state that the effective enforcement commitment is so covered, but are silent as to enforcement procedures for the other labor rights
commitments. See Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 4; Summary of the U.S.Singapore FTA, supra note 5.
154. See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3.
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BTPAA labor rights objectives are "general," rather than "principal."' 55 In any event, with regard to enforceability, these new FTAs still
constitute progress compared to the NAALC, which omitted eight of
eleven covered labor rights from all higher stages of the enforcement
process. 156 The administration's summary makes no mention of any
additional language regarding ratification and implementation of
ILO Convention No. 182 concerning the Worst Forms of Child Labour. '5 7 Compliance with this requirement of the BTPAA is therefore
in doubt.
The Chile summary, but not the Singapore summary, includes
procedural obligations regarding labor rights akin to those of the
NAALC. In this respect, the U.S.-Chile agreement goes farther than
the U.S.-Jordan agreement and farther than required under the
BTPAA. In addition, the Chile FTA, unlike the Singapore and Jordan
FTAs, also includes NAALC-like provisions for cooperative activities.
In lieu of trade sanctions, both the U.S.-Chile and the U.S.-Singapore agreements provide for imposition of monetary penalties, which
the government has labeled "an innovative enforcement mechanism"
for responding to non-compliance.15 The penalties are apparently
somewhat different from those provided for in the NAALC. They will
continue to be assessed so long as the offending country is in noncompliance, so in theory their coercive effect is ongoing. Workers
rights organizations, trade unions, and human rights NGOs are bitterly protesting what they regard as a retreat from the trade sanctions
remedy of U.S.-Jordan and, in a more limited sphere, that of the
NAALC.
The administration has conclusorily asserted that these FTAs
"meet the labor.., objectives provided by the Congress in the Trade
155. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
157. As of this writing, the text of the agreements with Chile and with Singapore were
not yet available. Characterization of these agreements is therefore drawn from secondary
sources, particularly the official government descriptions, Surnnary of the U.S.-Chile FFA,
supra note 4, and Summary of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 5. For background on
the history of efforts to incorporate Chile in NAFTA and its side agreements during the
Clinton administration, the negotiation of the Canada-Chile FTA which contemplated
Chile's accession to NAFTrA, and the eventual turn in the Bush administration toward negotiating a bilateral U.S.-Chile FA, see Hornbeck, sup/a note 37.
158. See Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 4; Singapore Trade Facts, supra
note 5; see also Brevetti, supra note 4 ("labor and environment provisions of the [U.S.-Chile
FTA] use fines in an innovative way to address situations where a signatory country is not
enforcing its own labor or environmental laws, [Assistant USTR for the Americas Regina]
Varga said").
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Act."' ' Whether the text of each agreement is actually in compliance
with the BTPAA labor rights objectives and priorities, however, is extremely unclear, as is how to evaluate the text relative to the level of
NAFTA/NAALC or the U.S.-Jordan TPA.
Thus, the direction of movenent appears to be more backward
than forward, despite steps taken in both directions.
5.

CAFrA

Negotiations have commenced for a Central American Free
Trade Agreement ("CAFTA"), between the United States and five
Central American countries-Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua.I'i The negotiations are in too early a stage
to hazard much of a guess as to the substance of either labor rights
provisions or institutional arrangements. 16 The United States, in an
apparent effort to comply with the trade promotion authority statute,
has proposed an approach along the lines of the U.S.-Jordan and U.S.Chile free trade agreements.'"I None of the Central American countries has expressed willingness to incorporate labor rights within the
main agreement; however, Costa Rica has indicated receptiveness to
following the NAFTA-NAALC model, with labor rights acknowledged
in a separate side agreement. Costa Rica is already a party to a free
trade agreement with Canada, which follows this model. ' None of
the other would-be CAFTA countries has gone even this far on the
record.
On the other hand, in early 2003 the parties agreed on a structure for negotiations, including five negotiating groups, one of which
will cover labor and environment.'14
No steps forward yet.
159. See Intent to Enter Into U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 151; Intent to Enter Into U.S.Singapore FIA, supra note 151; see also Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 4
(agreement "fully meets the labor objectives set out by Congress in TPA"); Singapore
Trade Facts, supra note 5.
160. See CAFTA Press Release, supra note 12.
161. Published documentation provides no information on this subject. See, e.g.,
CAFTA sources cited supra note 12.
162. See, e.g., Brevetti, CAFIA Kick Off supra note 10; Brevetti, AFI'A By Year's End,
supra note 10.
163. See supra notes 11-12, 114-121 and accompanying text; see also 19 U.S.C.
§ 3806(a) (2002) (recognizing that the FTAA negotiations had already commenced prior
to enactment of the BTPAA, and on that ground, according them special treatment).
164. See CAFFA Press Release, supra note 12, at 1.
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FrAA

A hemisphere-wide Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
("FTAA") is likewise underway. 165 The nascent FTAA negotiations
have produced a partial second draft of the treaty that recognizes the
need to bolster institutional arrangements beyond the bare bones
NAFTA model, in a treaty designed to cover thirty-four countries.'1 6
However, the measures taken in the current draft fall far short of what
is required to provide a sound multi-lateral implementation system for
the proposed agreement. Moreover, the draft document thus far
omits all mention of labor rights. The efforts of the United States and
Canada to accomplish their inclusion has been a source of intense
controversy.'"17 The negotiations themselves have been organized
without a separate working group on labor and environment.'Il Complaints are rampant that efforts to incorporate "civil society," for the
most part, have been limited to inclusion of input from business interests in the talks.'""
Therefore, there have been an indeterminate number of steps
backward, although the process is far from complete.
D.

Problems in Making Labor Rights "Progress"

The later FTAs incorporate labor rights within their main agreements, meeting the minimum precondition for satisfying the BTPAA
labor rights objectives. They add references to international labor
rights, although as a very soft constraint on domestic labor law. They
include anti-relaxation language, although its enforceability beyond
the scope of the effective enforcement commitment is narrow, if not
non-existent. While the Jordan agreement omitted due process obligations and cooperative activities, the Chile FTA seems to have restored
these important elements of the NAALC.
The core innovation of the NAALC, however, remains intact, now
enshrined in successive FTAs and in the principal negotiating objectives of the BTPAA: effective enforcement of domestic labor law as the
supranational obligation. The scope of coverage has been narrowed in
some important respects, but that is the most readily rectifiable aspect
of an effective enforcement obligation; future agreements could be
165.
166.
167.
168.
working
169.

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See FTAA Second Draft, supra note 14, chapter on dispute settlement.
See, e.g., GAO FTAA Report, supra note 14, at 7.
See lttp://wv.ftaa-alca.org/alca-e.asp-(last visited Mar. 28, 2003) (identifying
groups for the FTAA negotiations).
See, e.g., GAO FTAA Report, supra note 14.
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negotiated to restore the full eleven labor principle scope established
in the NAALC. The internationalization of the domestic standard has
the virtue of minimizing intrusion into national sovereignty and maximizing retention of flexibility and discretion by national governments.
However, despite its seeming success in resolving very serious sovereignty problems, there are some intractable, practical problems with
this approach.
In the NAFTA/NAALC situation, the effective enforcement solution was natural in light of the widespread contemporaneous perception that Mexico had labor legislation which was more than adequate
to guarantee workers' rights in the priority labor law subject areas
17
identified, if only Mexico would effectively enforce its own law.
Mexican law appeared to provide workers with statutory rights considerably more extensive than those provided by Canada as well as the
United States, and to give many labor rights constitutional
protection.

71

With the Jordan agreement, however, the limitations of this
model have begun to become apparent, and in future FTAs, the
problems are likely to worsen. When a country starts out lacking adequate legislation to cover the appropriate substantive labor law subject
areas, the treaty negotiators are likely to cut back on the inclusion of
those labor law subjects or principles which are targets of the labor
obligations. Moreover, where there is legislation but it is weak and not
up to international standards, a promise to "effectively enforce" that
law, however binding, is not very meaningful, unless the promise is
buttressed by one to implement an international labor law standard.
Similarly, buttressing commitments regarding due process and
the rule of law, procedures, and remedies are necessary. If one merely
asks a trading partner to effectively enforce domestic labor law without regard to structural defects in the labor tribunal system,
prosecutorial system, procedural context, and remedies, these elements will sabotage meaningful implementation of any labor norms
incorporated in domestic law, even if the country devotes large sums
of money and immense amounts of effort to enforce its flawed regime. However, in many potential trading partner countries, defects
170. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 55; see also, e.g., Garvey, supra note 40, at 442 ("The
principal complaint about Mexico has been not its lack of health and environmental laws,
but the lack of enforcement of its law and the related endemic corruption of its legal
system.").
171. See generally, e.g., Russo, supra note 84, at 83-86.
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in the real rule of law as applied to the entire political and legal order
are a well known fact.
Conceptually, effective enforcement poses a series of problems:
non-uniformity, perverse incentives, lack of pressure for an upward
spiral, comparative law, and ambiguity in the notion of effective enforcement itself.
Non-uniformity and resultant inequity among trading partners is
an obvious result of keying a commitment to existing domestic legislation. There will be many situations in which different trading partners
are subject to different actual burdens regarding their labor law commitments. The burdens will not necessarily be commensurate with the
country's level of economic and social development. Rather, they will
be commensurate with each country's existing labor legislation, along
with political constraints on their weakening existing labor laws prior
to entry into an FTA with the United States. For example, those whose
labor legislation on a given topic contains exemptions which exclude
the informal sector will be much better positioned than those whose
laws do not contain such exemptions, yet have similarly large informal
sectors in their economies. As Lance Compa has pointed out, this effectively "rewards countries with already low standards."' 72 If all countries functioned at their best and highest level, or were fully
democratic and reflected true political choices in their domestic labor
law, these differences could be legitimate. However, acting as if that
were the case, as free trade advocates are wont to do, does not make it
SO.

This naturally leads to the second problem with effective enforcement as the main labor rights commitment: perverse incentives. Reliance on domestic labor laws, together with pressure to incorporate
strong anti-relaxation language in trade agreements, risks creating
perverse incentives in trading partner countries to weaken or repeal
present labor laws prior to entering into an FTA with the United
States. In those countries that are at best weak democracies, countervailing political pressure may offer little resistance to such government strategies.

73

Overemphasis on domestic labor law as the benchmark undercuts
pressure for upward harmonization, whether to a newly-created, mutual standard, or to one incorporated from the ILO or another source
of "recognized international labor rights."' 74 While avoiding relaxa172.

173.
174.

Compa, supra note 23, at 689.
See id. at 689.
See id. at 710.
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tion is a good minimum goal, it takes no account of those countries
with virtually no protective labor legislation, nor does it encourage
upward aspirations. In the long run, trade will only be successful if it
promotes upward harmonization of labor standards, as well as the
standard of living. Because other labor commitments, such as effective
enforcement, may otherwise discourage raising the formal standards,
it is essential that provisions be included in FTAs which strongly
counteract this predictable tendency.
A further problem is the comparative law problem. It is often very
difficult to know exactly what the trading partner's domestic labor law
is, which one must know before one can effectively enforce it. By way
of illustration, does the United States effectively enforce its prohibition against sex discrimination in employment in the area of sexual
harassment? Given the complex jurisprudence about reasonable victims and about imputing liability to the employer for the acts of supervisory personnel and rank and file workers, 75 it is extremely difficult
for competent United States practitioners to fully discern the details
of the law in this area, and is a severe problem for foreign practitioners attempting to assess United States law.
Fully comprehending the United States law is a prerequisite to
evaluating it for conformity to the effective enforcement (or international labor rights) standard, and that evaluation also depends upon a
judgment about how law works and the acceptable range of variation
in degree of effectiveness. Ascertaining how the standard works in a
variety of factual contexts is a difficult prerequisite to assessing the
law's effectiveness in enforcing the basic rights. This is itself a contentious matter of judgment by domestic practitioners, Supreme Court
justices, and NLRB members, let alone for foreign legal experts who
stand outside the United States legal and industrial relations culture.
Non-uniformity exacerbates the comparative law problem, with
difficulty increasing in direct proportion to the number of trade
agreement signatories. Experience with the NAALC has amply illustrated how difficult it is to sufficiently master a few countries' domestic labor laws sufficiently to fairly assess whether they are being

175. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 791-92 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See generally, e.g., Marley S. Weiss, The Supreme Court
1997-1998 Labor and Employment Law Trm (PartI): The Sexual HarassmentDecisions, 14 THE
LAi. LAw. 261 (1998).
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effectively enforced.' 7" Application of a uniform, international norm
like that of the ILO involves an extremely difficult comparative law
activity. One must properly interpret the international standard, and
then assess both the facial domestic labor law language and the practice and enforcement thereunder, in order to monitor and assess
compliance. 77 Doing this by first understanding the domestic law
norm raises the level of difficulty by an order of magnitude. Compounding this difficulty by many countries simultaneously may simply
be beyond the capability of the United States and other trading partners in this hemisphere at the present time. Lacking a thorough understanding of another country's domestic labor law renders the
"effective enforcement commitment" itself effectively unenforceable,
quite apart from problems with procedures, remedies, and institutional arrangements. Neither the negotiators of these agreements, nor
the business and NGO leaders attempting to provide input, have displayed enough awareness of these difficulties.
The final problem is yet a tougher nut to crack. The negotiators
of the NAALC, and those who have followed in their wake, seem to
have missed the ambiguity in the notion of "effective enforcement."
On the one hand, a domestic statute can provide a substantive right or
command, and one can ask whether the statutory scheme as a whole
effectively enforces that command. On the other hand, one can take
the statutory scheme as a given, even though the scheme as a whole
renders illusory the formal grant of the substantive right, by precluding its meaningful implementation or excluding from coverage large
categories of persons who should be among the law's intended beneficiaries. It is all very well for a government agency to make sure every
worker who complains will have legal recourse and a day in court on
the worker's charge. If workers are unprotected against employer reprisals, blacklisting, and exclusion from future employment for filing
176. See, e.g., Report of Review in U.S. NAO 9601 (1997) (Fisheries Ministries/SUTSP)
(reviewing uncertainty over whether under Mexican constitutional law duly ratified international conventions, including those of the ILO, are automatically incorporated into domestic law and if so, whether previously or subsequently enacted domestic legislation may
withstand challenge in the event of conflict with the international norm); NAALC Seminar
Proceedings, supra note 47; Report of Review in U.S. NAO 9701 (1998) (Pregnancy Discrimination in the Maquiladoras) (reviewing uncertainty over coverage of prohibition of sex
discrimination extending to pregnancy and applicants for hire, as opposed to incumbent
employees).
177. See Marley S. Weiss, Monitoring to Maximize Implementation and Compliance
with International Labor Agreements, available at www.national-academies.org/internationallabor (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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with the government, however, few workers will invoke the governmental complaint process.
A minimum condition of future progress, therefore, is to revise
the effective enforcement provision to clarify it. Effective enforcement
shouid cover not "domestic labor laws" but the substantive commitments of domestic labor laws, which must themselves recognize and
protect specified international labor rights. If FTA labor rights provisions along the NAALC model are largely to be "truth in advertising"
requirements, the substantive promise of domestic labor laws ought to
be what the domestic law actually provides. Fine print, in either exclusions, defenses, procedures, or remedies, should not undermine the
delivery in practice of the substantive right, or the FTA labor rights
provision should be deemed to have been systemically violated. The
importance of this point will become clearer after an examination of
the enforcement provisions and experiences under the NAALC and
subsequent FTAs.
III.

Enforcement and Remedies from the NAALC Through
U.S.-Chile: Progress or Regress?

This section first outlines the NAALC procedures for enforcement of the agreement and resolution of violations. Next, it analyzes
the submissions cases under the NAALC to conclude which aspects of
the NAALC enforcement system function well, and which do not. Finally, it compares the NAALC arrangement to the scheme created by
the U.S.-Jordan FTA, the requirements of the BTPAA, the announced
approach of the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore FTAs, and the implications of this analysis for future FTAs.
The BTPAA requires the President to provide Congress with a
statement as to each trade agreement he submits to Congress for approval and implementation, that the agreement "makes progress in
achieving the applicable purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives"
of the Trade Act, and spelling out how and to what extent the agreement does So.178 An agreement that fails to make such progress fails to
satisfy the conditions for applicability of the BTPAA fast track procedures, 179 and is grounds for Congress to adopt a procedural disapproval resolution declining to apply the up or down voting rule to the
FTA in question. 8 ' It is doubtful whether much progress was made
178.
179.
180.

19 U.S.C. § 3805(a) (2002).
See 19 U.S.C. § 3803(b) (2) (2002).
See 19 U.S.C. § 3805(b)(1)(B)(ii)(IV) (2002).
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from Jordan to Chile and Singapore, and even more unclear whether
a future CAFTA or FTAA will make further progress.
A.

The NAALC Scheme

The NAALC has three distinct enforcement stages: consultation,
evaluation, and dispute resolution. Consultations are divided into two
82
steps: NAO-to-NAO consultations,'"' and ministerial consultations.'1
Any dispute over any aspect of interpretation or application of the
NAALC may be raised in consultations.' 81 If, after investigation, information sharing, and consultation, neither the NAOs nor the ministers
can resolve the dispute, a Party complaining of another Party's violation may take the matter to the second stage: the evaluation stage.
While the process can, in theory, be initiated by any of the three
governments, in practice it has been driven entirely by submissions
initiated by private actors. Each NAO is required under the NAALC to
provide for public communications,'1 4 often referred to as submissions,' 1 5 regarding "labor law matters arising in the territory of another Party."''" It is the NAO that initially reviews such public
submissions.'8 7 While it is technically possible for a private actor to file
a non-adversarial submission, in practice every submission filed thus
far has involved an allegation of a Party government's systematic noncompliance with one or more obligations of the NAALC, arising in
the context of one or more concrete legal disputes occurring in the
charged Party's territory.' Thus, while the process at this stage is intended to be "cooperative" between the Party governments,' 8 the
181. See NAAL.C, supra note 2, at 1507-08.
182. See id. art. 22, at 1508.
183. See id. arts. 21, 22, at 1507-08.
184. Each cotutry has developed its own procedural rules for handling submissions.
For the U.S. Procedural Guidelines, see 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660, 16,661-62 (Apr. 7, 1994),
available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/programs/nao/submiss.htm (last visited
Mar. 28, 2003). For the Canadian Procedural Guidelines, see http://www.labour-travail.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/doc/ialc-cidt/eng/e/guidlns-e.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Canadian NAO Procedural Guidelines].
185. Both terms have their origin in the provision that requires each NAO to "provide
for the submission and receipt and [to] periodically publish a list, of public communications
on labor law matters arising in the territory of another Party [and to] review such matters,
as appropriate, in accordance with domestic procedures." NAALC, supra note 2, at 1507
(emphasis added).
186. NAALC, supra note 2, art. 16 at 1507.
187. See id.
188. The allegations are summarized in Summary of Submissions, available at http://
www.naalc.org/ /english/publications/review-annexl_3.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
189. NAALC, supra note 2, art. 20, at 1507.
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members of the public invariably file submissions alleging wholesale
breach of obligations to provide a decent, fair, transparent, and impartial labor law system, with allegations that are highly adversarial. I,,0
The NAO first makes a preliminary determination that the matter
is within the scope of NAO authority and otherwise warrants review.
The United States Procedural Guidelines spell out official policy regarding the preliminary decision to accept a submission for review:
"In general, the Secretary shall accept a submission for review if it
raises issues relevant to labor law matters in the territory of another
Party and if a review would further the objectives of the
Agreement." 1"1
The NAO then investigates the matter, usually requesting information from the Party country against whom the submission is directed. The United States NAO often holds a hearing at thisjUncture
to gather additional information; the other two NAOs have done so
less frequently.'9 2 Based upon its investigation, the NAO issues a "public report of review" of the submissions case, summarizing the facts
and the law. The NAOs attempt to settle the case, but usually fail, in
which case they refer the case onward to ministerial consultations. If
the ministerial consultations do not resolve the matter, it can be taken
to the next stage of the procedure: the evaluation stage. However, in
practice, every case so far has ended either in dismissal, withdrawal by
the filers, or issuance of a ministerial implementation agreement.
The evaluation stage includes consultative steps before and after
its centerpiece: nonadversarial presentation of the matter to an Evaluation Committee of Experts ("ECE") for nonbinding fact-finding on
the parallel laws and practices of the complaining and complained
against countries with respect to the labor law obligation at issue.'1 3
190. See U.S. National Administrative Office, Status of Submissions, available at http://
www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Status of Snbnissions].
191. 59 Fed. Reg. at 16,661.
192. See Independent Experts' Report, Annex I to the Four Year Review Report, su/na
note 87, available at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/review-annexl.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2003).
193. NAALC, supranote 2, arts. 23(2). 25(1)(a) at 1508-09. See also Rules of Procedure
for ECEs, http://www.naalc.org/english/pblicatios/Rles%20of%2oProcedure%201E.
htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter ECE Rules]. "The Council considers that the
primary purpose of an ECE is to provide an independent, expert. analysis of an important
area of labor law enforcement on a comparative, tri-national basis for the mutual benefit of
all the Parties. The Council believes that such a process can be a useful way of obtaining a
new analytical perspective in important areas of mutual interest." Four Year Review Report,
supra note 87, at 2.
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The report is to provide more than just a "comparative assessment,"
however. It is also to include conclusions about "patterns of practice"
and "where appropriate, practical recommendations that may assist
14
the parties in respect of the matter." 9
Matters relating to the three collective labor principles-the right
of freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the right to strike-are excluded from the ECE level of the
process. In addition, the violation must be a systemic pattern of practice, involving a regular or recurring course of action or inaction, and
195
it must have trade-related effects.
Whether claims based on binding obligations regarding procedural due process and the rule of law can be presented to an ECE, at
least as to cases involving one of the eight labor principles covered at
that level, is an open question. Indeed, nearly everything about the
ECE stage is unresolved, because no case has ever been appealed beyond the ministerial consultations step. The question is not a purely
academic one. Submissions cases have alleged, for example, that the
composition of tri-partite Mexican Conciliation and Arbitration
Boards, which often include a representative of the "traditional" trade
union confederation, satisfies the procedural guarantee that labor
tribunals be "impartial and independent and ... not have any substan- when an independent
tial interest in the outcome of the matter,"'i'
7
union is contesting entitlement to represent workers at the firm. 19
If the Parties cannot settle the matter on the basis of the ECE's
report, the complaining Party may take the matter to the third and
final stage: dispute resolution. Only claims about three areas of labor
rights-occupational safety and health, child labor, and minimum
wage laws-may be raised at this level, however. 'I This stage also contains many steps, including: additional consultations; proceedings
before an arbitral panel which, if it finds a persistent pattern of nonenforcement, it may recommend a suitable remedial action plan; further negotiations on the basis of the arbitral panel report; possible
resubmission to the panel; and absent settlement, eventual award of a
monetary enforcement assessment to redress the violation."99

196.

NAALC, sulra note 2, art 25(1) at 1508-09.
See id. arts. 23, 49(1), annex 23 at 1508, 1513-14, 1516.
Id. art. 5(4) at 1504.

197.
198.
199.

See U.S. NAO 9601 (1997) (Fisheries Ministries/SUTSP).
See NAALC, supra note 2, arts. 27, 29(1) at 1508-09.
See id. arts. 27-41, annexes 41A-41 B, at 1509-1513, 1516-17.

194.
195.
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The monetary assessment, if paid, however, is to be used to bolster labor law enforcement in the complained against country's area
of deficiency. 20 0 If the country is so foolish as not to pay, it may be
subjected to trade sanctions by the complaining country in an
equivalent value to the amount of the assessments. 2 °11 This means that
instead of the financial penalty being used to support the country's
labor law enforcement processes, the funds are absorbed in the form
of trade sanctions. If the complained against country is Canada, however, instead of trade sanctions, the monetary penalty becomes domes22
tically enforceable as a judgment in the Canadian courts. 11
The process, as presented on paper, has been heavily criticized
not only for its narrowing scope of coverage, but for its multiple, interminable steps, which in theory could take several years. In practice,
neither of these defects have mattered much, since nothing has gone
beyond the ministerial consultations step to reach higher procedural
stages in the process.
A lack of deadlines, however, has proven important at the initial
consultations stage of the process, both at the NAO-to-NAO step and
at the ministerial step. Several cases have dragged on unresolved for
many months,20 3 because there is little to pressure governments to
promptly settle cases. The lack of meaningful enforcement measures
as to most cases clearly limits the leverage of one country in negotiating a settlement with another. It is hard to devise suitable endpoints
for cases, particularly once an NAO investigation has unearthed serious deficiencies in a national labor law scheme. The threat of an appeal to an ECE could provide the modest leverage of greater public
exposure and prestigious remonstrance, but even that threat is lacking as to the three collective labor law rights, which have provided the
basis for a majority of the alleged violations.
Diplomatic and political concerns have hamstrung NACs and labor ministries in initiating their own matters without the impetus of a
public submission, in creating real negotiating pressure to settle cases,
and in appealing cases to the ECE or higher levels. Sovereignty concerns led the NAALC negotiators to create a process that would remain in the control of labor ministry officials from the three countries
200. See id. annex 39, para. 3, at 1516.
201. See id. art. 41, annex 41B, at 1512-13, 1517.
202. See id. annex 41A, at 1516-17.
203. The Ministerial Council has itself resolved to try to "conduct the process as rapidly
as possible." Four Year Review Report, supra note 87, part I and part 2, at 2, 7-9. However,
cases handled since that report was issued have in fact bogged down even more.
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from start to finish. During the Clinton administration, this meant the
authorities were willing to exploit the sunshine effects of the process
up to a point, but no farther. During the George W. Bush administration, even this limited use of the NAALC procedures may cease.
An important byproduct is that such NAALC enforcement as has
occurred has been dependent upon the resources and agendas of the
labor movement, worker rights NGOs and other private actors, rather
than being guided by a rational scheme of labor rights development
and enforcement priorities. A review of the submissions cases helps
make this point even more clear.
B.

The NAALC Submissions: Filings and Outcomes

1. Composition of the Cases
No cases have yet produced the appointment of an ECE, and no
cases have progressed beyond ministerial consultations. Twelve submissions have been settled by ministerial agreement. 204 Only one
open case, still in the cooperative consultations process, raises issues
which if not resolved, could lead to appointment of an ECE. There
are no open submissions that could eventually go before an arbitral
panel.
During the first four years of the NAALC, only one submissions
case was filed before the Mexican NAO, and all others were filed
before the United States NAO. Delays in ratification of the Agreement
by Canadian provinces precluded the Canadian NAO from exercising
jurisdiction over such cases until 1998.2115 Between 1998 and January
204. See U.S. NAO 940003 (1995) (Sony); Mexico NAO 9501 (1996) (Sprint/LCF);
U.S. NAO 9601 (1997) (Fisheries Ministries/SUTSP); U.S. NAO 9701 (1998) (Gender Discrimination in Maquiladoras); U.S. NAO 9702 (2000) (Han Young); U.S. NAO 9703
(2000) (ITAPSA); Mexico NAO 9801 (2000) (Solec); Mexico NAO 9802 (2000) (Washington Apple Growers); Mexico NAO 9803 (2000) (DeCoster Egg); U.S. NAO 9901 (2000)
(TAESA); Mexico NAO 9804 (1999) (Yale/INS); and U.S. NAO 2000-01 (2001) (Auto
Trim/Custom Trim); see also, U.S. NAO, Ministerial Implementation Agreements, available
ot http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/minagreemt-toc.htm
(last visited Mar. 28,
2003); Ministerial Consultations Joint Declaration, available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/
niedia/repors/nao/jointdeclai)61102.him (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
205. The NAALC restricts Canadian NAOjurisdiction in submissions cases based upon
the extent of Canadian provincial ratification, because the Canadian government construes itself as unable to impose directly upon the provinces treaty provisions negotiated at
the federal level. The NAALC therefore requires provincial ratification to render the treaty
binding as to that province within the area of its labor law jurisdiction. See NAALC, supra
note 2, Annex 46; 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1517-19 (1993); see also Canadian Intergovernmental
Agreement Regarding the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, availableat
http://www.lahour-travail.h rdc-drhc.gc.ca/dc/ialc-cidt/eng/e/fial-e.html
(last visited
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2003, several submissions were filed before the Canadian and Mexican
NAOs, as well as additional submissions filed before the United States
NAO.

20 6

As of January 2003, a total of twenty five submissions had been
filed in all three countries. Sixteen were filed with the United States
NAO.207 Of these, fourteen were against Mexico, 208 and two were
Mar. 28, 2003). On the impact of Canadian federalism on its role in the NAALC, and more
broadly, its handling of international agreements, see generally NAALC Seminar Proceedings,
supra note 47.
206. Summaries of the submissions/public communications cases, along with their current status, may be found in Status of Submissions, supra note 191. These are also available
on the Commission website, at http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/summaryusa.htm, http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/summaryca.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2003), and http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/summarymx.htm (last visited Mar.
28, 2003); and on the Canadian NAO website at http://www.labour-travail.hrdcdrhc.gc.ca/doc/ialc-cidt/eng/e/submiss-e.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). The text of
the submissions themselves in more recent U.S. NAO cases may be accessed at http://
www.dol/gov/dol/ilab/programs/nao/submissions.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). Reports of review issued by all three NAOs may be found in each submissions case at http://
www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/public-reports-of-review.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2003).
207. See U.S. NAO 940001 (1994) (Honeywell); U.S. NAO 940002 (1994) (General
Electric/Compania Armadora); U.S. NAO 940003 (1994) (Sony); U.S. NAO 940004
(1994) (General Electric/Compania Armadora) (follow-up to U.S. NAO 94002); U.S. NAO
9601 (1996) (Mexican Fisheries Ministry/SUTSP); U.S. NAO 9602 (1996) (Maxi-Switch);
U.S. NAO 9701 (1997)(Maquiladora sector); U.S. NAO 9702 (1997) (Han Young); U.S.
NAO 9703 (1997) (ITAPSA) (related submission: Canadian NAO 98-1); U.S. NAO 9801
(1998) (AeroMexico/Flight Attendants); U.S. NAO 9802 (1998) (Mexican vegetable
farms/Tomato/Child Labor); U.S. NAO 9803 (1998) (McDonald's); U.S. NAO 9804
(1999) (Canada Post Corp./Rural Mail Couriers); U.S. NAO 9901 (1999) (TAESA); U.S.
NAO 2000-01 (2000) (AutoTrim/Custom Trim/Breed Mexicana); U.S. NAO 2001-01
(2001) (Duro Bag). A summary of each case is available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). The official report of the U.S. NAO in
each case may be accessed from http://www.dol.gov/ilab/nedia/reports/nao/public-reports-of-review.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). The text of the submissions in each U.S.
NAO case may be found at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/nao/publicsubmissions.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). Transcripts of the hearings are also available in two submissions: Transcript of Public Hearing on U.S. NAO Submission 2000-01
(Auto Trim/Custom Trim/Breed Mexicana), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/submissions/autotrinhearing.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Transcript of Public Hearing on U.S. NAO Submission 9901 (TAESA), available at http://
vvw.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/submissions/990ITranscript.htm
(last visited
Mar. 28, 2003). Because the official citation to each case consists merely of the identity of
the country whose NAO received the submission, followed by a nondescript number, it is
customary to refer to these cases by the identity of the employer or group of employers
whose labor law violations were allegedly not effectively responded to, triggering the claim
that the government in question was failing to effectively enforce its laws. The employer,
however, is not formally a party to the case; rather, it is the government in whose territory
the employer was allegedly breaking the law who is accused of breaching its NAALC
obligations.
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9 Thirteen of the sixteen submissions filed with the
against Canada. 211
United States NAO raised issues of freedom of association and the
right to organize, the right to bargain collectively and the right to
strike (in the aggregate, hereinafter referred to as collective labor
law). Nine of these confined themselves to one or more of these is21
sues.2 1 ) Four raised other issues as well collective labor law matters. '
Each of these four raised issues regarding occupational health and
safety as an issue other than collective labor law rights; all but one

raised additional issues as well. 2 12 Three raised no collective labor law
208. See U.S. NAO 940001 (1994) (Honeywell); U.S. NAO 940002 (1994) (General
Electric/Compania Armadora); U.S. NAO 940003 (1994) (Sony); U.S. NAO 940004
(1994) (General Electric/Compania Armadora); U.S. NAO 9601 (1996) (Mexican Fisheries Ministry/SUTSP); U.S. NAO 9602 (1996) (Maxi-Switch); U.S. NAO 9701 (1997) (Maquiladora sector); U.S. NAO 9702 (1997) (Han Young) U.S. NAO 9703 (1997) (ITAPSA)
(related submission: Canadian NAO 98-1); U.S. NAO 9801 (1998) (AeroMexico); U.S.
NAO 9802 (1998) (Mexican vegetable farms); U.S. NAO 9901 (1999) (TAESA); U.S. NAO
2000-01 (2000) (AutoTrim, Custom Trim/Breed Mexicana); U.S. NAO 2001-01 (2001)
(Duro Bag).
209. See U.S. NAO 9803 (1998) (McDonalds); U.S. NAO 9804 (1998) (Canada Post
Corp.).
210. See U.S. NAO 940001 (1994) (Honeywell) (freedom of association and the right to
organize); U.S. NAO 940002 (1994) (General Electric/Compania Armadora) (freedom of
association and the right to organize); U.S. NAO 940003 (1994) (Sony) (freedom of association and the right to organize, particularly through manipulation of the union registration process); U.S. NAO 940004 (1994) (General Electric/Compania Armadora) (freedom
of association and the right to organize); U.S. NAO 9601 (1996) (Mexican Fisheries Ministry/SUTSP) (freedom of association and the right to organize when merger of government
agencies under federal government labor legislation entails recognition of only one of the
pre-existing union representatives; impartiality of the conciliation and arbitration boards);
U.S. NAO 9602 (1996) (Maxi-Switch) (freedom of association and the right to organize);
U.S. NAO 9801 (1998) (AeroMexico) (right to strike); U.S. NAO 9803 (1998)
(McDonalds) (freedom of association and the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, alleged closure of facility to avoid unionization); U.S. NAO 2001-01 (2001) (Duro
Bag) (freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively; particularly non-secret
ballot union representation/ownership of the collective agreement voting process).
211. See U.S. NAO 9702 (1997) (Han Young) (freedom of association and the right to
organize, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses); U.S. NAO 9703 (1997)
(ITAPSA) (freedom of association and the right to organize, right to bargain collectively,
prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, minimum employment standards) (related submission: Can NAO 98-1); U.S. NAO 9804 (1998) (Canada Post Corp.) (freedom
of association and the right to organize, right to bargain collectively, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, and
elimination of employment discrimination); U.S. NAO 9901 (1999) (TAESA) (freedom of
association and the right to organize, minimum employment standards including hours of
work, overtime premium pay, payroll deductions for social programs, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, impartiality of the tribunal, and tndue delays in the enforcement processes).
212. See U.S. NAO 9702 (1997) (Han Young). This submission raised only collective
labor and occupational health and safety issues.
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issues, alleging only violations of technical labor standards: one case
regarding pregnancy discrimination,2 1 3 one case regarding child labor, 21 4 and one case regarding prevention and compensation of occupational illnesses and injuries.2 15 The United States NAO held
2t 6
hearings on nine of the submissions.
Six submissions have been filed with the Mexican NAO. 2 17 All

Mexican NAO submissions were against the United States. Canada was
213. See U.S. NAO 9701 (1997) (Maquiladora sector).
214. See U.S. NAO 9802 (1998) (Mexican vegetable farms/Tomato Growers).
215. See U.S. NAO 2000-01(2000) (AutoTrim/Custom Trim/Breed Mexicana).
216. See U.S. NAO 940001 (1994) (Honeywell) (freedom of association and the right to
organize); U.S. NAO 940002 (1994) (General Electric/Compania Armadora) (freedom of
association and the right to organize); U.S. NAO 940003 (1994) (Sony) (freedom of association and the right to organize, particularly through manipulation of the union registration process); U.S. NAO 940004 (1994) (General Electric/Compania Armadora) (freedom
of association and the right to organize) (follow-up to U.S. NAO 94002); U.S. NAO 9601
(1996) (Mexican Fisheries Ministry/SUTSP) (freedom of association and the right to organize when merger of government agencies under federal government labor legislation
entails recognition of only one of the pre-existing union representatives; impartiality of the
conciliation and arbitration boards); U.S. NAO 9701 (1997) (Maquiladora sector) (pregnancy discrimination in the export processing sector in Mexico); U.S. NAO 9702 (1997)
(Han Young) (freedom of association and the right to organize, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses); U.S. NAO 9703 (1997) (ITAPSA) (freedom of association and
the right to organize, right to bargain collectively, prevention of occupational injuries and
illnesses, minimum employment standards); U.S. NAO 9901 (1999) (TAESA) (freedom of
association and the right to organize, minimum employment standards including hours of
work, overtime premium pay, and payroll deductions for social programs, prevention of
occupational injuries and illnesses, impartiality of the tribunal and undue delays in the
enforcement processes; U.S. NAO 2000-01 (2000) (AutoTrim, Custom Trim/Breed Mexicana) (prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses). The administration under president George W. Bush has
recently resolved this first case by dismissing the matter without a hearing, in U.S. NAO
2001-01 (2001) (Duro Bag) (freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively).
217. See Mexico NAO 9501 (1995) (Sprint/La Connexion Familiar) (freedom of association and the right to organize; alleged plant closure to avoid unionization); Mexico NAO
9801 (1998) (Solec) (freedom of association and the right to organize, right to bargain
collectively, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, minimum employment standards); Mexico NAO 9802 (1998) (Washington State Apple Growers) (freedom of association and the right to organize, right to bargain collectively, prevention of occupational
injuries and illnesses, compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, minimum employment standards, employment discrimination, protection of migrant workers); Mexico
NAO 9803 (1998) (DeCoster Egg) (prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, minimum employment standards, elimination of discrimination, protection of migrant workers); Mexico NAO 9804 (1998) (Yale/
INS) (lack of enforcement of minimum wage and overtime minimum employment standards legislation as to foreign workers because of MOU requiring U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL") inspectors to examine immigrant status of workers and report potential
violations to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") (parallel submission:
Canadian NAO 98-2); Mexico NAO 2001-1 (2001) (New York) (New York State worker's
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not named as a Party in any of the six. All submissions against Canada
have so far been filed with the United States NAO. The involvement of
migrant workers, foreign workers, or Hispanic-American workers has
been a prominent feature in each of the submissions filed with the
Mexican NAO.
Three submissions were filed with the Canadian NAO.21x One
submission was against Mexico, while two submissions were against the
United States.
2.

Outcomes of the Submissions

a.

Cases an NAO Declined to Accept for Review or Cases That
Were Withdrawn by the Submitters

Only a handful of submissions have been disposed of summarily,
without an NAO investigation and issuance of a report. Under United
States procedural guidelines, the NAO should accept a submission for
review unless either it raises no issues relevant to labor law matters in
the territory of another Party, or if review would not further the objectives of the Agreement.2 1 9 Canada's procedural guidelines adopt a
22
similar test. 0

In the case of only four submissions, 22 1 the NAO declined to accepted the matter for review because the alleged infringement of one
compensation system violates NAALC substantive obligations regarding compensation for
occupational iniuries and illnesses, as well as prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, and in addition, violates various due process and procedural commitments).
218. See Canadian NAO 98-1 (1998) (ITAPSA) (Party-Mexico) (filed by United Steelworkers of America and in concert with other unions and organizations concerning freedom of association and the right to organize, right to bargain collectively, and prevention
of occupational injuries and illnesses in Mexico) (parallels U.S. NAO 9703); Canadian
NAO 98-2 (1998) (Yale/INS) (filed by a group of United States immigrant rights and
union organizations arguing a lack of enforcement of minimum wage and overtime minimum employment standards legislation as to foreign workers because of memorandum of
understanding requiring U.S. DOL inspectors to examine immigrant status of workers and
report potential violations to INS) (parallels Mexico NAO 9804); Canadian NAO 99-1
(1999) (LPA) (filed by U.S. Labor Policy Association, an employer organization, and
EFCO, a United States employer, concerning NLRA Section 8(a)(2) prohibition against
employer domination of or assistance to labor organizations, alleged to contravene NAALC
Art. 3 commitment to promote worker-management committees to address labor regulation of the workplace).
219. See U.S. NAO Procedural Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,660, 16,661-62.
220. See Canadian NAO Procedural Guidelines, sulira note 184.
221. See U.S. NAO 9801 (1998) (Aeromexico/Flight Attendants); U.S. NAO 9804
(1998) (Rural Mail Couriers); U.S. NAO 2001-01 (2001) (Duro Bag); and Canadian 99-1
(1999) (LPA); see aLvo Status of Submissions, supra note 191. U.S. NAO 9802 might be
regarded technically as a fifth case not accepted for review, but it was dismissed because of
lack of prosecution by the submitters, the Florida Tomato Exchange, an employer organi-
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of the eleven labor listed labor rights was in clear conformity with domestic labor law, hence was not deemed to state a claim of violation of
a Party's NAALC obligations. Three were submissions to the United
States NAG, and one to the Canadian NAG. The Mexican NAG has
accepted all six submissions filed with it.222
In U.S. NAG 9801, the Mexican Association of Flight Attendants
protested denial of freedom of association and the right to strike in
connection with a strike against Aeromexico. The Mexican government, pursuant to emergency labor dispute authority under Mexican
law, had taken over the operations of the airline, forcing the employees to return to work. While it dismissed the submission, however, the
United States NAG commissioned a research project evaluating reconsafety, security,
ciliation of the right to strike with national interests 2of
23
countries.
three
and general welfare in each of the
In U.S. NAG 9804, the Canadian rural letter carriers protested
their exclusion from Canadian labor legislation, including the laws
providing for the right to organize and bargain collectively, as well as
their treatment as independent contractors, which denies them protection against occupational illnesses and injuries and protection
against employment discrimination. The exclusion is pursuant to statute, so the United States NAG declined to accept the submission for
review. However, despite formally rejecting the case, in response to
this submission, the United States and Canadian NAls jointly conducted a cooperative activities seminar on exclusions from coverage
under their respective labor laws, focusing on independent contractor
zation. Canadian NAG 98-2, the parallel case to Mexico NAG 9804, regarding the United
States Department of Labor MOU with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, might
be regarded as a sixth case not accepted for review. However, this case was effectively settled on the basis of the new MOU negotiated between the United States DOL and the INS
to eliminate the problem of deterrence of workers from filing wage and hour complaints
with the Labor Department for fear of triggering INS investigation, in resolution of Mexico
NAG 9804. Id.
222. See submissions cases cited supra Part lli.B.1 and the accompanying footnotes.
223. See The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, Emergency Procedures for Resolving Labor-Management Disputes in the United States, Canada and Mexico,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/public/media/reports/nao/EmergencyProcedures.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). On the American emergency dispute body of labor law, see also Marley
S. Weiss, The Right to Strike in Essential Services Under United States Labor Law, in RELACIONES
LABORALES IN EL SIGLO XXI at 95 (Patricia Kurczyn, ed. 2000), available at http://
info.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/kurcz.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). That article
was written for a comparative labor law conference co-sponsored by the Mexican Department of Labor (Secretarfa del Trabajo y Previsi6n Social, or "STPS") and the Institute of
Juridical Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico ("UNAM"), at which
one session focused on labor emergency dispute legislation and the right to strike.
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status, temporary, and other forms of contingent labor, supervisory,
managerial and crown attorney exclusions. 224
One dismissed case was a submission to the Canadian NAO: CAN
99-1. This case was one of only two cases filed before any NAO by an
employer organization. Section 8(a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act 225 prohibits employer domination of or assistance to labor

organizations, thereby precluding many forms of worker participation
or labor-management committees in non-union establishments. The
employer organization in CAN 99-1 contended that Section 8(a) (2)
violated a United States obligation under the NAALC. The NAALC
provision requires "[e]ach Party [to] promote compliance with and
effectively enforce its labor law through appropriate government action, subject to Article 42, such as: .. .(e) encouraging the establish-

ment of worker-management committees to address labor regulation
of the workplace." 22" Because the domestic United States statute itself
was the source of the claim, and conformed to all other domestic law,
no NAALC violation was deemed to be alleged. 22 7
The United States NAO recently dismissed the submission of U.S.
NAO No. 2001-01 (Duro Bag), on the vague ground that pursuing the
matter would not serve the purposes of the agreement. The Duro Bag
case alleged, among other things, that Mexican government commitments contained in prior Ministerial Implementation Agreements, to
assure free choice of union representation, particularly through secret
ballot voting, had not been fulfilled, posing a whole new set of issues
under the NAALC. 228 In resolving the case, the United States NAO
took the position that Mexican law did not provide for secret ballot
elections in union representation voting. Hence, notwithstanding the
commitment to provide and effectively enforce the right of freedom
of association, as well as commitments reached in the course of ministerial agreements in resolution of prior submissions cases, the NAO
concluded that no violation of the NAALC was alleged. Mexico was
224. See agenda and linked summaries of presentations at this program, available on
the website of the U.S. NAO at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/programs/nao/
trontoagenda.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003). Many of the papers have been electronically
published, available at http://laboris.uqam.ca/toronto.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
225. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2001).
226. NAALC, supra note 2, art. 3(1)(e), at 1503.
227. See Status of Submissions, supra note 190. The summary reports that the submitters filed an appeal, which Canadian NAO procedures permit-from a dismissal of a submission. No result is reported, however, on the appeal, which was filed in 1999.
228. See U.S. NAO Public Submission 2001-01 (2001) (Duro Bag), available at http://
www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/submissions/durosibmission.html
(last visited
Mar.28, 2003).
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failing to enforce a right, the right to a secret ballot, which did not
exist under Mexican law. The United States NAO therefore declined
to accept the case for review, asserting that review would not further
229
the objectives of the NAALC.
This case is uniquely disturbing among the NAALC submissions,
because it raises deeper questions about the enforceability of an
agreement so dependent on the prosecutorial discretion and diplomatic and political judgment of a country's executive branch labor
ministry. Mexican law is contradictory regarding secret as opposed to
open balloting, 2 30 and the Mexican government had previously entered into commitments in conjunction with prior Ministerial Implementation Agreements which it was allegedly violating in its election
practices at Duro Bag. Regardless of the reach of the obligations of
the NAALC itself, additional commitments entered into in settlement
of submissions cases ought to be fully enforceable, and normally
should be vigorously enforced by Party governments lest their failure
undermine whatever vestiges of credibility the agreement may have.
Duro Bag also confirms the ambiguity problem in the meaning of
"effectively enforce."2 3 1 Mexican labor law substantively promises
workers the right to form and join unions of their own choosing, leaving open the .details of the method. The procedural approach in most
Mexican jurisdictions of open voting on employer premises, in front
of the employer and union representatives, effectively precludes free
exercise of this right.
Three submissions have been withdrawn or abandoned by the
submitters. U.S. NAO 940004 (General Electric/Compania
Armadora) and U.S. NAO 9602 (Maxi-Switch), were unilaterally withdrawn by the submitters. In Maxi-Switch, the withdrawal followed a settlement between employer and union in the underlying labor dispute,
reached under pressure of the pending NAALC submission. U.S.
NAO 9803 (McDonald's) was also withdrawn by the submitters after
229. See Status of Submissions, U.S. NAO Submission 2000-1 (Duro Bag), http://
www.dol.gov/ILAB/programs/nao/status.htm-(last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
230. See Public Report of Review in U.S. NAO 9702 (Han Young), available at http://
www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/pubrep9702.htm -(last visited Mar. 28, 2003);
Public Report of Review in U.S. NAO 9703 (ITAPSA), available at http://www.dol.gov/
ILAB/media/reports/nao/pubrep9703.htm -(last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Agreement on
Ministerial Consultations, U.S. NAO Submissions 9702 and 9703 (Mexican government
commitment to "promote the use of eligible voter lists and secret ballot elections in disputes over the right to hold the collective bargaining contract," the Mexican equivalent to
exclusive bargaining agent status in the United States), available at http://www.dol.gov/
ILAB/media/reports/nao/minagreement9702-9703.htm_ (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 228-29.
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they reached agreement with the Canadian provincial government to
have the underlying issues regarding sudden facility closures and closures motivated by anti-union animus, be studied by a provincial council.23 U.S. NAO 940004 was related to U.S. NAO 940002, another
General Electrics case which was fully processed, and in which an
NAO review report was issued, although the case was found to lack
merit and no ministerial consultations were requested. Nevertheless,
the GE case triggered joint cooperative programs intended to address
freedom of association issues raised in the submission. 2:3
U.S. NAO 9802, the other case filed by an employer organization,
the Florida Tomato Exchange, alleged violations of labor protections
for children by Mexican vegetable growers. However, after filing the
initial submission, the organization asked that the matter be held in
abeyance. Later, it failed to respond when submission of further information was requested by the NAO, in effect, abandoning the submission. On that basis, the U.S. NAO declined to accept it for review.
In two mutually-related submissions, Mexico NAO 9804 and Canadian NAO 98-2, something approximating full relief was obtained
by settlement. The two submissions had alleged that the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") then in effect between the DOL and
the INS deterred workers from filing wage and hours complaints with
the labor department. The MOU was intended to promote efficient
use of government investigatory resources by having DOL wage and
hour inspectors, in the course of their inspections, also inspect 1-9
forms and otherwise address issues of immigration status of employees. DOL inspectors were to bring suspected violations to the attention of the INS for further action. The deterrent effect of the risk of
initiating an INS investigation by workers complaining to the DOL
about wage and hour violations was eliminated in the new MOU nego2 34
tiated by the DOL and the INS.

b.

Reports of Review and Ministerial Consultations

Reports of review have been issued by the NAO to whom the matter was submitted in every case except those withdrawn or abandoned
by the submitters, those denied acceptance for review by the NAO,
and the settled case regarding the U.S. DOL - U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service MOU. One exception is the most recent submission, Mexico NAO 2001-01, which claims that the New York State
232.
233.
234.

See Status of Submissions, supra note 190.
See id.
See id.
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workers' compensation system systematically provides untimely and inadequate compensation to workers for their occupational illnesses
and injuries, violating the NAALC obligation on compensation for occupational illnesses and injuries. That submission was still open as this
article was going to press.
Of those cases in which the U.S. NAG has issued a report, the
matter has progressed from NAG-to-NAG consultations (the initial
level), to ministerial consultations (the next level) in seven instances:
U.S. NAG 940003 (Sony), 9601 (Fisheries Ministries/SUTSP), 9701
(Gender in the Maquiladoras), 9702 (Han Young), 9703 (ITAPSA),
9901 (TAESA), and 2000-01 (Auto Trim/Custom Trim/Breed
Mexicana).
Of the six submissions to the Mexican NAG, a report of the review was issued in four, Mexico NAG 9501 (Spring/LCF), 9801
(Solec), 9802 (Washington Apple Growers), and 9803 (DeCoster
Egg). In all four, Mexico initiated ministerial consultations over the
submission. The fifth submission, Mexico NAG 9804 (Yale/INS), is
the one involving the U.S. DOL - INS Memorandum of Understanding,2 35 which was replaced with a newly negotiated MOU, effectively
resolving the matter. However, that case, too, became the subject of a
ministerial implementation agreement. The sixth case, Mexico NAG
2001-01 (New York), is still open, challenging the remedies, methods
and procedures of the New York State workers' compensation
authority.
c.

Ministerial Implementation Agreements

Seven ministerial implementation agreements have been
reached, covering twelve cases.2 36 The earliest ministerial implementa235. See id.
236. See Ministerial Agreement on U.S. NAG 940003 (1994) (Sony) (freedom of association: union registration), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/
minagreemt940003.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Mexico NAG 9501 (1995) (Sprint)
(freedom of association: sudden plant closures, plant closures to avoid unionization), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/minagreemt9501.hun (last visited
Mar. 28, 2003); Ministerial Agreement on U.S. NAG 9601 (1996) (Mexican Fisheries Ministry/SUTSP) (freedom of association: choice of collective bargaining representative, exclusivity of representation and its relationship to scope of the bargaining unit; neutrality of
conciliation and arbitration boards), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/minagreemt9601.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Ministerial Implementation
Agreement in U.S. NAG 9701 (Maquiladoras) (pregnancy and sex discrimination), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/mcia.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2003); U.S. NAG 9702 and 9703 (1997) (Han Young and ITAPSA) (freedom of association
and occupational safety and health), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/minagreement9702-9703.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003); Mexico NAG 9801,
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tion agreements focused on deepening mutual understanding of the
operation of each other's labor laws, through the conduct of seminars, conferences, and programs directed at the specific type of problem underlying the submission, particularly when the NAO report
itself was uncertain about the domestic legal situation. U.S. NAO
940003 (Sony), for example, alleged denial of freedom of association
to workers. It challenged the manipulation of the union registration
process to obstruct completion of legal formalities by an independent
union. It also contested the Mexican labor law systems' acceptance of
"protection contracts," through which a Mexican employer is free to
enter into a collective agreement with a union commanding little or
no membership among the employer's workforce, and without the
knowledge of the workers either that the union has claimed to represent them, or of the terms of the agreement. In addition, by entering into an "exclusion clause," the equivalent of a closed shop
arrangement, the employer can bind itself to hire only employees who
are already members of the "protection contract" union. This submission was resolved through the conduct of a tri-national government-togovernment seminar on the domestic operation of labor law bearing
on conferring representation and collective bargaining rights on a labor union in each of the three countries.
Mexico NAO 9501 (Sprint) alleged that the United States did not
effectively provide freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively in the context of plant relocations in order to avoid unionization. That case was resolved by the Ministerial Council charging the
Secretariat to conduct a comparative tri-national research study of
sudden plant closures to avoid unionization.
U.S. NAO 9601 (Mexican Fisheries Ministry), was resolved
through the conduct of a tri-national comparative seminar on the relationship between domestically ratified international treaties and
conventions and domestic law. Mexico had ratified International Labor Organization conventions regarding freedom of association and
9802, 9803 (1998) (Solec; Washington Apple Growers; Maine/DeCoster Egg) (migrant
workers, freedom of association, occupational safety and health, workers' compensation,
minimum employment standards, employment discrimination), available at http://
wv.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/minagreemt9801-9802-9803.htm (last visited Mar.
28, 2003); U.S. NAO 9901, U.S. NAO 2000-01, Mexico NAO 9804 (TAESA; Auto Trim/
Custom Trim/Breed Mexicana; Yale/INS) (freedom of association, the right to organize,
the right to bargain collectively, minimum wages, prevention of occupational injuries and
illnesses, compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses, and the protection
of migrant workers),
available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/
jointdeclar061102.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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collective bargaining. Its legislation limiting federal government
agency employees to representation by one union per agency had
been previously found by ILO organs to violate its obligations under
that convention. In the NAALC proceedings, the Mexican government contended that ILO conventions were not automatically incorporated into domestic law, and did not automatically override
conflicting statutory enactments, although opposing views were
presented on this problem of Mexican constitutional law. 2 37 Therefore, Mexico had reasoned, the ILO conventions did not become a
part of the corpus of domestic labor law whose effective enforcement
238
was an obligation of Mexico's under the NAALC.
Resolution of later cases has several times involved obligating the
complained against NAO to conduct public education and outreach
sessions to clarify the rights of affected workers and to improve worker
awareness, hence enforcement of the allegedly under enforced labor
rights. In U.S. NAO 9701, the case involved claims of sex discrimination, particularly pregnancy discrimination among maquiladora industry employers. The strongest allegations included claims that
employers routinely compelled applicants for hire and employees already on the payroll to undergo pregnancy tests, refused to hire applicants already pregnant, demanded assurances of applicants that they
were using contraception or otherwise ensuring they would not become pregnant, and firing incumbent employees who were suspected
of having become pregnant. During the U.S. NAO investigation of the
submission, the Mexican NAO asserted that its labor law statute prohibited sex discrimination only against incumbent employees, not applicants for hire. It also asserted that its Conciliation and Arbitration
Board tribunals had jurisdiction only over matters involving incumbent employees, notjob applicants, so that even were the statute interpreted to cover applicants for hire, they would have access to no
forum providing redress for the violation.
The implementation agreement for the maquiladora pregnancy
discrimination submission contained four elements: (1) a government-to-government conference regarding pregnancy discrimination
issues in the workplace, and enforcement mechanisms permitting
workers to assert pregnancy-related anti-discrimination rights; (2)
United States and Mexican outreach sessions in the border area to
237. See NAALC Seminar Proceedings, supra note 47.
238. The edited transcript of the presentations at the seminar have been published in
NAALC Seminar Proceedings,supra note 47. For an analysis of the issues raised in the submission and the seminar, see Weiss, supra note 47.
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assure dissemination of public information regarding these rights and
enforcement mechanisms; (3) the NAOs were to conduct a conference on enforcement mechanisms for effectuating protections against
pregnancy discrimination and the rights of working women; and (4)
the Secretariat was to publish a public report reflecting the issues in
the outreach sessions and the conference. 2 11There was also a commitment by the Mexican government to reverse its previous position and
issue a clarification that the statute covered applicants for hire as well
as incumbent employees.
The agreement for U.S. NAO 9702 and 9703 (Han Young and
ITAPSA) covered allegations of denial of freedom of association as
well as failure to effectively enforce occupational safety and health
provisions. Mexico agreed to host a tri-national seminar on the role
and structure of labor boards in each of the three countries, and later,
to host a tri-national government-to-government meeting on occupational safety and health issues. Mexico had previously hosted a public
education seminar on freedom of association in connection with these
two cases, although members of an independent union attended and
engaged in a physical confrontation with members of rival, traditional
unions, disrupting the program and engendering considerable
controversy.
The agreement covering Mexico NAO 9801, 9802, and 9803
(Solec, Washington Apple Growers, and DeCoster Egg) led both to
inter-governmental meetings and public outreach programs targeted
to reach migrant workers. In 2001, a government-to-government meeting was held to explore avenues of cooperation concerning protection
of the rights of migrant workers. This is a field which poses some complicated problems in the United States because many of these workers' rights are set at the state rather than federal level, the workers are
exempted from coverage under some, but not all regularly applicable
federal and state labor legislation, and numerous different agencies,
federal and state, have jurisdiction over union organizing and collective bargaining, elimination of employment discrimination, establishment of minimum conditions of employment, occupational safety and
health, and protection of other migrants' rights, the issues raised by
the submission. During 2000, a series of five migrant agricultural
workers public outreach sessions were conducted by the U.S. DOL,
one each in California, Florida, Washington State, Ohio, and New
239. See Ministerial Consultations Implementation Agreement, U.S. NAO Submission
9701 (1997) (Gender), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/nao/
mcia.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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York State, intended to educate migrant agricultural workers, especially women workers, about their labor and employment rights. In
the spring and summer 2001, public forums were held in Washington
State and Maine on migrant worker labor and employment rights issues, particularly agricultural labor issues, which would include participation by officials of relevant state as well as federal agencies. In
addition, a tri-national Conference on Agricultural Migrant Labor in
North America was held in Los Angeles, California, from February 7
to February 9, 2000.24 11 The ministerial agreement also required the

Secretariat to publish a tri-lingual guide covering substantive law and
enforcement procedures for labor and employment rights provided
for migrant workers in the three NAFTA/NAALC countries, which
has yet to appear.
In U.S. NAO 9901 (TAESA), and U.S. NAO 2000-01 (AutoTrim),
along with Mexico NAO 9804 (Yale/INS), a single ministerial agreement was reached, aimed at resolving all cases pending ministerial resolution. It covers a wide range of claims, including freedom of
association, the right to bargain collectively, minimum wages, prevention of occupational injuries and illness compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, and protection of migrant workers. To
resolve issues about occupational safety and health, the United States
and Mexican Labor Secretaries established a Bi-national Occupational
Safety and Health Working Group, which will be headed on each side
by a high level official in the field, and bolstered by technical experts.
The group will meet on an ongoing basis and collaborate to solve
technical problems. The Mexican Labor Secretariat ("STPS") also undertook to engage in a public education and outreach campaign to
improve worker awareness of governmental legal advice and assistance
for workers regarding prevention and compensation of occupational
injuries and illnesses, and practicalities about claims filing and appeals. Issues regarding formation of unions and collective bargaining
rights will be addressed together with freedom of association issues
from an earlier ministerial implementation agreement in U.S. NAO
9702 and 9703 by holding a trilateral seminar on the structure of labor boards, their roles in union recognition and collective bargaining,

240. See Protection of Migrant Agricultural Workers in Canada, Mexico and the United
States: Legal Background Paper Prepared by the Secretariat for the Tri-National Cooperative Activity on Migrant Agricultural Work, Los Angeles, California, Feb. 7-9, 2000, at
http://www.naalc.org/english/publications/ sum infoworkers.htm (background paper
prepared for the conference) (last visited Mar. 28, 2003).
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as well as "structures that guarantee the impartiality of labor boards,"
24 1
and best practices and procedures regarding labor boards.

d.

ECE and Arbitral Dispute Resolution-Eligible Cases

No matter has yet been taken before an ECE, although there
have been a significant number raising one or more issues which
could have qualified. The one open case, raising the matter of compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, would be eligible if
no resolution is reached at the ministerial consultations stage. In light
of the non-remedial nature of most of the ministerial implementation
agreements, plus the recurrence of similar types of violations suggesting that systemic enforcement problems in some areas remain unremedied, one must question the propriety of avoiding sending any
cases on to the ECE level for independent fact-finding. Because no
cases have passed through the ECE stage, none have been eligible for
appeal to an arbitral panel and potential trade sanctions.
IV.

Designing FTA Labor Provisions for Implementability
and Enforceability

The NAALC experience illustrates the limits of an enforcement
system dependent upon private initiative, as well as one totally under
the control of political and diplomatic government actors. Problems
in the NAALC process have clearly manifested themselves. That the
lack of strong remedies or enforcement measures would make it difficult to negotiate meaningful settlements even in strong cases was predictable. That a non-adjudicatory, diplomatic negotiations process
would fail to yield consistent interpretation of NAALC obligations and
would flounder in efforts to devise substantial solutions to real domestic labor law enforcement problems, was foreseeable. That the long,
drawn out process, without firm internal deadlines, providing for no
relief in the underlying domestic cases, would discourage members of
the public from filing, and would hold down the volume of cases,
could also have been forecast in advance.
Perhaps less obvious was the extent to which the needs, agendas,
and resources of interested organizations would dictate the NAALC
enforcement agenda. Freedom of association, collective bargaining,
241. joint Declaration, supra note 206. The U.S. NAO has issued an agenda for the
seminar, to be held March 20, 2003 in Nuevo Leon, Mexico. U.S. NAO, North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation Trilateral Seminar: Labor Boards in North America
(copy on file with the author).
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and the right to strike issues predominated throughout the first several years of NAALC submissions, even though it was obvious from the
outset that these issues could never go past the first stage of the enforcement process, and hence had little prospect for achieving a significant resolution. During the first four years after adoption of the
NAALC, with one exception, all submissions pertaifed to freedom of
association, the rights to organize, to bargain collectively, and to
strike. In the nine year history of the NAALC, there has been only one
case involving compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses
and one case on child labor, even though both are areas of immense
importance and rampant violation.
Certainly collective labor rights constitute an area in which many
violations of domestic labor law occur, but that is not the entire explanation. Sweat shops violating minimum wage and overtime laws, child
labor laws, and occupational safety and health laws, are also notorious
and rampant in certain areas of the United States and Mexico. Employment discrimination is clearly a huge problem in the United
States, to judge from state and federal court filings; in Mexico, based
on reports of maltreatment of women and indigenous population
members; and in parts of Canada, as to linguistic minorities within a
province as well as other groups of workers. Only one case, however,
has made discrimination in employment its central focus, and only
one (subsequently withdrawn) was aimed at child labor.
The explanation for the imbalance in the case filings is not the
relative prevalence of systematic failures to enforce domestic labor
laws. Rather, it is that the trade union movement across all three
countries (in Mexico, primarily the independent rather than the establishment trade unions) has funded the lion's share of filings before
all three NAOs. Child labor does not have the organized constituency
that supports other workers' rights. NGOs focused on women's rights,
indigenous rights, and the rights of racial minorities are less oriented
than the labor movement toward pressure tactics and publicity, which
are the main real sanctions available through the NAALC. Despite
having authority to initiate investigations and negotiations on their
own, none of the three NAOs ever took any such steps. Political and
diplomatic forces make it extremely difficult for a unit housed within
an executive branch agency like the Department of Labor to take such
hostile action toward its counterpart in another country.
For lack of an independent, tri-national entity with prosecutorial
authority, the enforcement of the NAALC will continue to depend on
the level of funding, commitment, and interest of NGOs and the labor
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movement to pursue submissions cases on particular labor law subjects. The main limitation of dependence on private actors to initiate
enforcement is that the enforcement is likely to emphasize those areas
where organized interests and stakeholders have the most to gain or
lose, and those prospects may be only indirectly tied to the transnational labor rights measure they are directly enforcing. If the NAALC
had stronger remedies, it might be easier for organizations to justify
allocation of more resources to its utilization, but the proportionate
emphasis would remain dependent on their levels of interest, rather
than a coherent enforcement strategy. If meaningful enforcement is
to be achieved, it would seem that either incentives for private enforcement efforts must be increased substantially, or a transnational
FTA labor enforcement entity is required; preferably there would be
both.
Despite all of the attention focused on the long, drawn out
NAALC process, and the unfairness of its exclusion of certain labor
rights from higher stages of the process, the truth is that none of the
cases are progressing, no matter what their topic. The explanation
seems to lie in the control of the process by diplomats and political
appointees, who are extremely reluctant to take cases to an ECE, even
when they are eligible to do so. For lack of willingness to pursue the
harder sunshine effect of an ECE, the position of the governments in
negotiating ministerial implementation agreements is not very different even as to matters which could proceed to higher levels or even to
monetary penalties. There is no credible threat that this will occur,
even in occupational safety and minimum wage matters. Settlements
have now assumed an entrenched pattern of yet another tri-national
seminar to study the problem and benchmark best practices, even
when the problem has already been fully examined, and it is clear to
all that only through domestic changes in labor law policy and practices will compliance with the NAALC actually occur.
The common theme through many of the submissions is not that
of a government which systematically sits on its hands and declines to
enforce its laws on the books, under funds enforcement agencies, or
has corrupt labor inspectors. Although there is no doubt that these
problems are significant, they are not what the submissions cases are
aimed at. In nearly every submissions case, the problem is one of the
ambiguity of the effective enforcement obligation. A national labor
law system nominally promises workers a particular labor right, be it
the right to organize and bargain collectively, protection against sex
discrimination in employment, or a promise of reasonable, timely
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compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses. The system then
defeats the truth in advertising premise of the effective enforcement
promise, either by exclusions and exceptions, or by procedural provisions which thwart meaningful realization of the formal right. Mexico
promises freedom of association and the right to organize, but force
workers to vote for union representation on the employer's premises,
in front of their bosses and the union bosses of the protection union
the employer has handpicked. 242 In the New York workers' compensation system, workers are shut out of the tort system in return for which
they ostensibly receive swift and sure, reasonable, albeit low, compensation for their injuries, as well as medical and rehabilitation costs, but
the poorly funded and organized New York state system transforms
this promise into a charade. 243 In Mexico, workers are assured that it
is illegal for their employer to fire them for organizing an independent union, but the remedies and procedures for wrongful discharge
make it rare for a worker to hold out for actual adjudication of his or
her claim; 24 4 the same could be said, perhaps, for the NLRB processes
and remedies in the United States.2 45 The Mexican tri-partite Conciliation and Arbitration Boards are systematically biased when the union
representative seated on the Board is from a "traditional" union and
the case involves an insurgent organizing campaign by an independent union. 2 46 This is a structural incompatibility with the due process/rule of law provisions, which cannot be rectified without
changing the Mexican law on the composition of these boards.
No further seminars, studies, or reviews will solve these problems.
They result from one provision of the law being either flatly inconsistent with another, or undermining its full effectuation. It is for this
reason that effective enforcement of domestic law must be detached
from its moorings in the surrounding domestic law context. Once the
domestic law purports to promise the full effectuation of the supranational labor rights principle, deference to the contradictions of surrounding domestic law renders the FTA labor rights provision a dead
242. See U.S. NAO Submission 2001-01 (2001) (Duro Bag); Report of Review in U.S.
NAO 9702 (1997) (Han Young) and in U.S. NAO 9703 (1997) (ITAPSA).
243. See Submission in Mexico NAO 2001-01 (2001) (New York State Workers' Compensation System).
244. See Public Report of Review of U.S. NAO Submission 9701 (1997) (Pregnancy Discrimination in the Maquiladoras).
245. See, e.g., Charles J. Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes: Discriminationfor Union Activity
under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'vJ. 327 (1998).
246. See Public Report of Review of U.S. NAO Submission 9601 (1996) (Fisheries Ministries/SUTSP).
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letter, unless it is understood to require changes in domestic law to
the extent that they are inconsistent with the corporate labor rights
principle.
This type of analysis makes it clear that a permanent, impartial
tribunal is essential to adjudicate these cases. Diplomacy and negotiation do not produce a rule of law. This is true of labor rights in the
NAALC, and it will surely be true of the U.S.-Jordan FTA and other
agreements which reserve control over investigation and prosecution
of claims of violation to the national governments. Such a body can
also develop an integrated understanding of domestic labor law in
each of the Party countries, and of how that law relates to FTA
obligations.
Ironically, in the BTPAA, Congress urged that future free trade
agreements be interpreted and enforced in a more rule of law-like
fashion.2 4 7 To accomplish this, however, will require at least two
pieces of real infrastructure, lacking from NAFTA, the NAALC, the
U.S.-Jordan, U.S.-Chile, and U.S.-Singapore FTAs: a supranational enforcement body, beholden not to the staff member's home country
but to the free trade area as a whole, and a supranational permanent
tribunal. The enforcement body solves the problem of the diplomatic
brake preventing vigorous enforcement of provisions of the agreement which are honored in the breach. The permanent tribunal allows for the systematic development of a coherent body of
interpretation of the treaty itself, as well as the, relationship between
FTA obligations and domestic labor law provisions in each of the Party
countries.
Judged by this standard, the U.S.-Jordan FTA enforcement and
dispute provisions may move more backwards than forwards. The procedures are much like a truncated NAALC system, starting with consultations, omitting the ECE stage, and moving to an arbitral panel
whose nonbinding recommendation may provide the basis for imposition of proportional trade sanctions.248 The coverage of labor rights
inder the regular enforcement and remedies is offset by the weakness
of the procedures and remedies, and the total lack of FTA institutions
apart from joint activities of the two administrations. While theoretically, trade sanctions remedies may be available for violation of any
covered labor right, and leaving aside the claims of some that only the
effective enforcement commitment receives the benefit of this en247.
248.

See 19 U.S.C. § 3802 (2002).
See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 3, arts. 15-17 at 75-78.
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forceability, the reality is that no labor rights claims are going to reach
the arbitral panel stage, let' alone be the subject of trade sanctions. If a
case is presented and consultations fail, the political officials in charge
are no more likely to take the case to an arbitral panel than those
same officials are to present a NAALC case to an ECE.
Moreover, the U.S.-Jordan agreement lacks any textual provision
for public communications or submissions. Unless the two countries
establish such procedures by mutual agreement, there will not even be
a vehicle for initiating cases that allege systemic breach of FTA obligations. Given that no country has yet openly initiated a consultations
proceeding under the NAALC without the impetus of a public submission, this lack of structured opportunity for public input and an established procedure for investigating cases is a serious flaw of the
agreement, not only as to labor rights but as to other provisions as
well. The Singapore and Chile FTAs appear to follow these aspects of
the Jordan model. If so, they will be similarly flawed.
Experience under the NAALC has shown that an insider-outsider
strategy is necessary to investigate these cases. 249 Most submissions are
the product of collaboration between labor unions or NGOs on' both
sides of the border, along with the efforts of government officials devoted to bringing the agreement to life despite its deficiencies. Governments acting alone are poorly situated to initiate cases in part
because they are not in the workplace or the courts or agencies of the
other government on a regular basis, like the citizens and organizations of that country.
In this respect, the NAALC has been a real, if unintended, success. The nature of the submissions process against one country, by
filing with another country's NAO, has fostered the cross-border collaboration necessary to produce the strongest submissions in many
cases. While this feature could be partially replaced by a knowledgeable, professional supranational enforcement agency, some vehicle and
incentive for public initiation and participation in enforcement
processes is necessary for them to be effective.
The final way in which the U.S.-Jordan FTA is thought by some to
represent a major labor rights advance is in the applicability of trade
sanctions as a remedy. The rumored substitution of a form of monetary assessment for trade sanctions in the U.S.-Chile and U.S.-Singapore agreements has been decried as taking a step back.
249.
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I am not as sure about this as the trade unionists and worker
rights advocates, however. Trade sanctions are similar to the sanction
of contract debarment for federal government contract violators
under Executive Order 11246, and similar laws. These sanctions are
rarely applied, because they are so draconian; moreover, they hurt the
very people who are the intended beneficiaries of their deterrent effect. Debarring a government contractor employer will throw all the
workers, victims of discrimination along with all the rest, into unemployment. Imposing trade sanctions may similarly throw exactly those
workers whose labor rights are injured by non-enforcement into unemployment when the United States market for the goods or services
they are producing is cut off.
Even worse, reluctance to impose such strong remedies undercuts the likelihood of their imposition, eviscerating the deterrent effect that is their primary justification to begin with. To the extent that
workers in the breaching country become aware that the result of pursuing their FTA claims will be trade sanctions that will undermine
their own sector of the economy, the workers are unlikely to collaborate in developing these cases. In addition, trade sanctions are likely
to depress the job market and labor standards in the country that violates the agreement. Sanctions will only rectify the harm done to the
complaining country's competing industry employers and their employees if the "appropriate and commensurate countermeasure" is
delicately crafted by the complaining country's government to accomplish this goal. Sanctions so designed, however, may not yield a proportionate impact, or may not be feasible because of the essential
nature of the product or services or because of domestic political
considerations.
Conclusion
The NAALC expressed the goal that increased trade would lead
to an upward, rather than a downward, spiral in labor rights and living
standards, and indeed, was negotiated as a supplement to the basic
NAFTA agreement precisely to calm fears that the opposite would be
the case. This leveling upward, in the long term, is the necessary concomitant of expanded trade and investment. To make real progress,
future FTAs must provide meaningful enforcement mechanisms, realistic remedies, and an interpretation of effective enforcement that obligates the actual delivery to workers of the rights purportedly
provided in the domestic labor law system. Agreements which do anything undermine the very norms of transparency and truth in advertis-
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ing that they purport to implement. Free trade unmoored from
effective, enforceable labor rights provisions will eventually lose public
support in all participant countries, for continued integration of regional economies. Morally, politically, and economically, it will become a form of unsustainable development.
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